University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses

Graduate School

5-2017

A Critical Perspective on Scalian-Originalism’s Interpretation of
the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause
Shiela M. Hawkins
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, shawkin8@utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes
Part of the Communications Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hawkins, Shiela M., "A Critical Perspective on Scalian-Originalism’s Interpretation of the First
Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2017.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4746

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE:
Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Shiela M. Hawkins entitled "A Critical Perspective
on Scalian-Originalism’s Interpretation of the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause." I
have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that
it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with
a major in Communication and Information.
Lori Amber Roessner, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Michael T. Martinez, Catherine Luther
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

A Critical Perspective on Scalian-Originalism’s Interpretation of the First Amendment’s
Freedom of Speech Clause

A Thesis Presented for the
Master of Science
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Shiela M. Hawkins
May 2017

Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my mentor Dr. Dwight Teeter. His passion for
Communication Law was evident in his research and in his commitment to his students’ success.
With his passing he leaves behind a legacy of accomplished scholarship and a challenge for
future scholars to pick up the mantle after him. It is now the duty of those who follow him to
strive for the same degree of excellence in their work, and to continue his indefatigable study of
Communication Law.

ii

Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my committee for all of their support and guidance. Without
their unwavering encouragement this manuscript would not have been possible. I would like to
thank Dr. Michael Martinez for sharing his vast legal knowledge with me and his ability to help
me refine some difficult legal concepts. I would like to thank Dr. Catherine Luther for her
dedication to my graduation and for her invaluable insight. Finally, I would like to thank Dr.
Amber Roessner for the countless hours she put into ensuring that I walked away from this
project a better writer and scholar, and for helping me find direction every time I found myself
lost among the trees.

iii

Abstract
Justice Antonin Scalia proudly proclaimed that he was an Originalist, which is the theory that the
Constitution should be interpreted in the same manner as those who ratified and drafted the
document would have interpreted it. Scalian-Originalism faced several liberal legal critiques that
challenged the legitimacy of the method and theory. This manuscript seeks to further the debate
regarding Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment by applying a Critical
Legal perspective. The analysis is done in the form of an immanent critique, and examines the
legitimacy of Scalian-Originalism’s First Amendment interpretation by the theory’s ability to
further equality and democratic participation in American society.
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Chapter I: Introduction

In 2005, the state of California passed Assembly Bill 1179, which prohibited the sale of
violent video games to minors. The bill claimed that the state had the compelling interest to curb
psychological, social, and neurological harm to minors who were exposed to violent video
games. Those found to violate the law could be punished up to $1,000 for each infraction. 1The
video game industry fought back, contending that video games have been subject to selfcensorship by the Entertainment Software Rating Board, akin to the Motion Picture Association
of America’s film rating system, which distributes video games to various age demographics
based upon the game’s respective content since 1994. Furthermore, the Entertainment Merchants
Association argued that video game content was protected by the First Amendment. The district
court ruled in favor of the Entertainment Merchants Association, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision, blocking the state of California from enacting the law; in 2010,
the United States Supreme Court heard arguments for the case.2
During the arguments Justice Antonin Scalia likened video games to movies, and
asserted that since the founding of the country, violence—unlike pornography—had not been
constituted as an obscenity. This logic prompted Scalia to ask the lawyer representing California
to explain how the framers of the First Amendment would view this case. This prodding by
Justice Scalia drew a scathing rebuke from Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who responded by
saying, “What Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about video

1

"AB-1179 Violent Video Games: Sales to Minors." California Legislative Information. October 7, 2005. Accessed November
12, 2014. http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200520060AB1179.
2Brown

v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 S.Ct. 3729 (2011)
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games.”3This remark received a rousing round of laughter from within the court room. The
statement made by Justice Alito was preposterous and a jovial mockery of Justice Scalia’s
method for constitutional interpretation known as Originalism, which applies the eighteenth
century understandings of the Constitution to modern American jurisprudence. However, the
sarcastic comment was perfectly aligned with some of the formalist and liberal legal critiques,
such as the ones made by Appellate Court Judge and author Richard Posner which assert that
Scalian Originalism’s methodology allows for the practice of law office history,4 is subjective,
and fails to a provide practical objective method for judicial restraint.5
Modern critiques of Originalism dance around the notion that Scalian-Originalism is an
illegitimate method of constitutional interpretation, but few are as bold as esteemed jurist
Richard Posner to support a realist argument that, “Originalism is fake.”6Posner’s analysis of
Originalism mirrors current liberal legal arguments opposing Originalism within the judiciary
and the academy, which primarily apply a formal legal analysis to identify contradictions with
the methodology and the theory of the rule of law.7 This traditional liberal method of analysis
has led to many attempts to revamp Originalism with the hope of making it a viable theory and

3

Savage, David G. "Supreme Court Appears Split on California Video Game Violence Law." Los Angeles Times, November 3,
2010. Accessed December 1, 2014. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/03/business/la-fi-court-videos-20101103-6.
4

Law office history refers to the use of selective historical content to support a predisposed position. Essentially, a particular
ruling is desired, and then historical evidence is found to support the desired ruling, instead of evidence being used to foster a
ruling.
5

Posner, Richard A. "Interpretation." In Reflections on Judging. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013.

6

Id. 233.

7

In this context, the term formal legal analysis is referring to the belief in the possibility that a determinate legal solution can be
garnered from one’s innate conclusion of quasi-deductive reasoning. The terms formal and liberal legal analysis will be treated as
synonymous for the purpose of this research. Also, the rule of law refers to the concept that American democracy should
governed by law and not by man, as to insure that arbitrary decisions are not made by judges.
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methodology while ignoring the possibility that it is nonviable.8Therefore, it could be argued that
the insistent use of formal legal analysis further supports the notion that there is a strong
legitimacy claim for Originalism. However, if a Critical Legal perspective were to be applied to
Scalian-Originalism new arguments may possibly be formed to support the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of this theory and methodology.
The purpose of this thesis is to perform a Critical Legal analysis of ScalianOriginalism to determine the legitimacy of this form of constitutional interpretation, which
appears to emphasize the maintenance and strengthening of the status quo. The focus of this
research will be on Justice Scalia’s brand of Originalism, which I am referring to as ScalianOriginalism, as it applies to the interpretation of the First Amendment. The First Amendment’s
freedom of speech clause arguably plays an important role in upholding certain democratic ideals
within American society. These democratic ideals are built on a foundation of autonomy.9 They
are pervasive and apart of the American social consciousness, which values liberty above all
else.10Applying Critical Legal Theory, which is the theoretical approach that challenges
normative legal principles from the perspective that law can either sustain or eradicate societal
injustice, to the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause’s central meaning, as defined by
Alexander Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson, will help provide a strong concrete theoretical
approach from which Critical Legal Studies can examine the legitimacy of Scalian-Originalism’s
interpretation of the First Amendment.

8

Griffin, Stephen M. "Rebooting Originalism." University of Illinois Law Review 2008, no. 4 (2008): 1185-223.

9

Meiklejohn, Alexander. "The First Amendment Is an Absolute." The Supreme Court Review 1961 (1961): 244-66.

10

Fried, Charles. "The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty." The University of Chicago Law Review 59,
no. 1 (1992): 225-53.
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This manuscript acknowledges that for over two decades the Court had two self
proclaimed Originalists–Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Antonin Scalia, as well as other
Justices who were not above dipping their toe in the pool of Originalism from time to time when
deciding a case.11 In fact the growing use of Originalism in modern Supreme Court cases has
caused some scholars to declare that Originalism is the only true theory and methodology for
constitutional interpretation, and that currently it would be “difficult, in American political-legal
culture, to make a persuasive case for nonoriginalism.”12Due to Michael Perry’s argument that
“we are all Originalist now,”13it would be too cumbersome of a task for this thesis to examine all
forms of Originalism along with every judge that has practiced Originalism at one time or
another. Often cited as the “pioneer” of Originalism–14Justice Scalia was widely recognized as
the preeminent proponent of the practice.

15

As such, during his time on the Court prior to

passing away, Scalia received praise from many, including President Ronald Regan, for his
Originalist rulings.16
On Saturday, February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia was found dead at the age of 79.
His passing left a vacant seat on the Court for over a year after the Republican led Congress

11

Silver, Derigan, and Dan V. Kozlowski. "The First Amendment Originalism of Justices Brennan, Scalia, and Thomas."
Communication Law and Policy 17 (2012): 392-94.
12

Perry, Michael J. "The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation." Virginia Law Review 77, no. 4
(1991): 687.
13

Id. 685-87.

14

Shesol, Jeff. "Rightward Bound." The New York Times, July 2, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/books/review/uncertain-justice-and-scalia.html.

Accessed

December
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2014.

15Silver,

Derigan, and Dan V. Kozlowski. "The First Amendment Originalism of Justices Brennan, Scalia, and Thomas."
Communication Law and Policy 17 (2012): 395-96.
Calabresi, Steven G. “Introduction.” Originalism the Quarter-Century of Debate, 17-20. Washington DC: Regnery Publishing,
2007.
16
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refused to confirm former President Barack Obama’s nominee Merrick Garland. The Republican
Senate’s stonewalling tactic allowed for President Donald Trump to nominate another Originalist
judge, Neil M. Gorsuch, to take Scalia’s place.17 This nomination and his subsequent
confirmation demonstrate the lasting impact Scalian-Originalism has had in American
jurisprudence, and the desire of some to continue Scalia’s judicial legacy.
As the author of the framework from which Originalism is viewed and critiqued

18

and

the most vocal Originalist until his death, Scalia’s brand of Originalism will be the focal point of
this thesis. By departing from the traditional formal legal analysis and applying a Critical Legal
perspective to the critique of Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment, I
intended to further the debate on the consistent nature of Scalian-Originalism and its
authoritative power within the courts.
In total, seventeen First Amendment cases were examined by applying the Critical Legal
Studies method of an immanent criticism. This method of legal analysis mediates the
“stucturalist” and “subjectivist”19 points-of-view by “merely criticizing a pre-existing delusion in
order to liberate those who labor under it.”20Simply put, the methodology of an “immanent

17

The Editorial Board. (2017, January 31). When the GOP stole Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court seat, they set the stage for a
miserable battle. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved March 31, 2017, from http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-supremecourt-nomination-20170131-story.html
18

Scalia, Antonin, and Bryan A. Garner. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2012.

19

The structuralist strand of critical legal theory attempts to look at the repressive structures created within American society that
forms a pre-existing belief structure through which legal decisions are made. The subjectivist strand places an emphasis on an
individual’s subjective experience, and how that personal experience shapes an individual’s understanding of the legal and social
world. Some have argued that these two competing strands nullify each other because you can apply one strand without applying
the other. James Boyle concedes that this argument is true and that both strands are symbiotic, but he argues that Critical Legal
theorist must, and will, prioritize one strand over the other. For this paper it should be noted that the structuralist strand will take
priority over the subjectivist strand.
20

Boyle, James. "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought." University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 133, no. 4 (1985): 769.

5

critique” applied in this manuscript will allow the legal analysis to focus on ScalianOriginalism’s erroneous interpretations of the First Amendment, but not require the analysis to
argue the validity of opposing constitutional methods. This thesis will examine freedom of
speech cases in which Scalia used an Originalist argument between 1986 and 2011.21The
intention is to find themes within these rulings to highlight Scalian-Originalism’s ability to either
preserve or refute the societal injustices perpetuated by law through the hierarchical power
structure. This research is important because it adds a contrasting perspective to an ongoing
debate, and hopefully will allow for future research on the feasibility of Originalism’s continued
ascension.
The following chapter of this thesis will explain Critical Legal Theory and its methods,
define Scalian-Originalism, and briefly explain liberal First Amendment doctrine and how it
aligns with Critical Legal Theory. The context provided will present an understanding of the
liberal legal justifications that legitimizes Originalism as a method of constitutional
interpretation. The framework will be provided for the reader to engage in the manuscript’s
critique of Scalian-Originalism from a Critical Legal perspective.

21

Silver, Derigan and Dan V. Kozlowski. "The First Amendment Originalism of Justices Brennan, Scalia, and Thomas."
Communication Law and Policy 17. (2011): 402-408.
Silver and Kozlowski examined all fifty-six freedom of expression cases in which Justice Scalia wrote an
opinion. Their research found that Scalia did not use an Originalist argument in any of his First Amendment rulings until 1990;
however, they note that his use of Originalism as a justification for his rulings has appeared to increase over time. The authors
also claim that Scalia’s opinions are supported by Original-Meaning Originalism. In total the authors found that there were
seventeen cases in which Scalia’s rulings were supported by an Originalist argument. For the purpose of analysis this manuscript
will accept Silver and Kozlowski’s research findings that Scalia produced seventeen cases containing an Originalist argument and
go beyond their research to examine these Originalist rulings from a Critical Legal perspective.
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Chapter II: Theory and Method

CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY
Critical Legal Theory was born from the civil unrest of 1960s and ‘70s. This theory
acknowledges the inequalities within American society brought to light by the civil rights and
feminist movements. Scholars then began using this theory to evaluate social disparities within
the American legal doctrine. Critical Legal Studies is an interdisciplinary approach that draws
from philosophy, economics, history, etc., to “fashion critiques that expose the inherent
contradictions in liberal thought and to demonstrate the use of liberal theory to hide the
contradictions.” 22By considering the problems of contradiction, Mark Hager argues, “CSL tends
to imply that liberal law is illegitimate because of its manifest failure to achieve moral and
conceptual consistency.”23 There are two tenets of Critical Legal Theory and one objective,
which is to pursue egalitarianism and further democratic participation.
The first argument of Critical Legal Theory is that the law disproportionately favors the
elites and serves to maintain an alienating status quo. Borrowing from the social philosophies of
Max Weber and Karl Marx, Critical Legal Theory argues that the persistent allegiance to a
hierarchical institutional structure of the law causes the underlying social division within
American society. Roberto Mangaberia Unger argues that the capitalistic hierarchy creates a

22

Cohen, Jeremy, and Timothy Gleason. "Distinguishing Law and Legal Theory." In Social Research in Communication and
Law, 49. Vol. 23. Sage Publication, 1990.
23

Hager, Mark. "Book Review Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, By Mark Kelman." The American
University Law Review 37 (1988): 1057.
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status quo that disproportionately favors an elitist agenda.24 He cites the practice of contract law,
which claims to have “free” and willing participants, but in reality contracts are so ingrained
within American society’s structure that in order to participate on a communal level individuals
feel obligated to enter in to contracts regardless of how “fair” they are for both parties, as an
example of the legal maintenance of the status quo. He also cites property rights, considered a
naturally moral right from a formalist perspective, but an inescapable residual effect of
capitalism.25
Peter Gabel and Paul Harris argue that the orthodox Marxist view mirrored by Unger’s
argument does not account for the political nature of the societal structure. Instead of the law
being simply a “toolbox of the ruling class,” Gabel and Harris argue that the “ legal system is an
important public arena through which the State attempts—through manipulation of symbols,
images and ideas—to legitimize a social order that most people find alienating and inhumane.”26
By acknowledging the political nature of law as defined by the hierarchal structure of society,
Gabel and Harris argue that social alienation can be addressed and political policy shaped within
the political and judicial arenas. Consequently, allowing for a social progression toward an
egalitarian social connection.27
The second tenet of Critical Legal Theory dispels the notion that law can be, or is,
neutral, natural, and objective. Claiming to have normative authority on legal analysis, liberal

24

Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. "The Critical Legal Studies Movement." Harvard Law Review 96, no. 3 (1983): 561-675.

25

Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. "The Critical Legal Studies Movement." Harvard Law Review 96, no. 3 (1983): 561-675.

26

Gabel, Peter, and Paul Harris. "Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law." Review
of Law and Social Change XI (1982): 370.
27

Id. 369-411

8

legal discourse aims to examine law with the understanding that it can be neutral and objective,
and that the rule of law, which does not allow for the subjectivity of man, is the pinnacle state of
law. The rule of law doctrine creates a sense of legitimacy for the law because it seeks to solidify
law within the public consciousness by suggesting that the law can be concrete and that it is
beyond being socially engineered. However, Critical Legal scholars argue that legal discourses,
meaning both legal ideas and social practices, are structurally political.28 The law is not removed
from society; in fact, it plays a circular role in creating and maintaining the structural status quo.
Social types and the inescapable institutional structures shape legal discourses. 29 The notion that
the interpretation of the law in a neutral and objective manner cannot occur, as formal legal
theory suggests, supports the Critical Legal argument that the liberal state will inevitability
collapse. However, James Boyle argues that Critical Legal Theory has shifted its focus from “the
failure of neutrality in the interpretation of law and toward a focus on the politically ‘tilted’ way
in which legal doctrine re-presents social reality.”30 Therefore, the hierarchal structure of
American society explains the political “tilt” of legal doctrine. The political nature of law,
Critical Legal scholars argue, allows for the judicial system to help create a new normative
vision that champions increased egalitarianism and a more participatory democracy.
This goal is first achieved by recognizing the contradictions and arbitrariness within the
legal system.

However, the existence of contradictions and arbitrariness is not criticized.

28

Boyle, James. "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought." University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 133, no. 4 (1985): 685-780.
29

Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. "The Critical Legal Studies Movement." Harvard Law Review 96, no. 3 (1983): 561-675.

30

Boyle, James. "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought." University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 133, no. 4 (1985): 697.
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Instead, according to Mark Hager, criticisms focus on how liberal law “responds to
contradictions and for the bias in the arrangements of its arbitrariness.”31 Therefore, Critical
Legal scholars must analyze the entire legal system from a perspective that accepts
contradictions and arbitrariness, but evaluates these patterns as they pertain to the support of
egalitarianism and democratic participation.32In an attempt to create a “better” normative vision
for the law, a Critical Legal theorist, such as Hager, recognizes the inherent “moral and
conceptual flaws lying within libertarian assumptions and the liberal legal assumptions which
support them.”33
By accepting the subjective and political nature of law and acknowledging that the legal
system is a result of a flawed societal structure, which has formed a hierarchy based on the
traditions of racism, sexism, and economic disparities, then legal participants, such as judges and
lawyers, can begin to use the law as means to challenge the status quo. Gabel and Harris assert
that the optimal method to refute the current social alienation of individuals by the status quo is
to politicize the legal system. They advocate that lawyers should become activist within the court
room to move the legal process in a direction of equality. For these theorists, the use of media to
break down the mysticism and legitimacy of the legal system is imperative to social change
because it would allow for individuals to shape a new popular consciousness that delegitimizes
the doctrine of a neutral law. This would allow for a change in social consciousness away from

31

Hager, Mark. "Book Review Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, By Mark Kelman." The American
University Law Review 37 (1988): 1063.
32

Id.

33

Hager, Mark. "Book Review Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, By Mark Kelman." The American
University Law Review 37 (1988): 1054.
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an individualistic mind set and toward a more altruistic one. Therefore, Gabel and Harris argue
for a method of social change that works within the preexisting confines of American society,
which would allow for the critique of the elitist agenda and its elimination from the law.34The
ability to use the law as a tool for egalitarianism would not only allow for “activist” legal
participants, but demand them. Therefore, the role of judges would not be to maintain an
objective status quo, but to interpret the law in such a way as to combat the deep-seated
inequalities within American society.
The interdisciplinary approach of Critical Legal Theory authorizes the use of the
judiciary as a means to achieve a more equitable American society. For critics the allowance of
an activist judiciary proves problematic.

Other critics focus on Critical Legal Theory’s

highlighting of contradictions and exposing of disharmonies between the law and the prescriptive
societal conceptions. For those scholars Critical Legal Studies can prove difficult to describe and
understand in clear positivist terms. This abstract nature of Critical Legal Theory is the first of
three major critiques.
Critics argue that the method is too theoretical and lacks pragmatic applicability to the
current legal discourse.35 The argument that Critical Legal Theory is too theoretical to actually
gain traction within the mainstream discussions of legal discourse is a fair assessment of scholars
such as Unger.36 Those who argue for a complete overhaul of how individuals think and interact

34

Gabel, Peter, and Paul Harris. "Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law." Review
of Law and Social Change XI (1982): 369-411.
35

Boyle, James. "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought." University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 133, no. 4 (1985): 688.
36Hager,

Mark. "Book Review Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, By Mark Kelman." The American
University Law Review 37 (1988): 1064-68. Unger argues that the constraints placed on an individual by the hierarchical
structure of law, prevents the natural human desire for freedom of choice. This freedom is imperative for deconstructing the
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with the law without first changing the societal structure take a highly theoretical stance.
However, the judiciary’s and academy’s inability to fathom any theory and method beyond
formalism serves to buttress the Critical Legal argument that the law is not a neutral social entity
above the constraints and biases of the societal structure. Preexisting definitions would not
confine individuals if the law were truly neutral and beyond social construction. Simply put, if
law was not legitimized by its shaping through the societal structure, it would not be a difficult
task to examine law from several opposing theories. Furthermore, embracing the political nature
of law allows for the application of Critical Legal Theory’s activist methods.37 By consistently
highlighting the biases and inequalities perpetuated by maintaining the status quo, Critical Legal
theorist can begin to change the popular consciousness regarding the objective of law; thus,
allowing for social change that values egalitarianism over neutrality.38
The second critique of Critical Legal Theory is that it is nihilistic because of its rejection
of the rule of law doctrine.39 Critics claim that advocating for the abandonment of the rule of
law, favoring instead a legal system that aims to create a more equal society in which democratic
participation prevails, is anarchistic. Hager argues that this is an ill-founded critique by “those in

status quo and reaching a state of greater equality. The American liberal legal discourse attempts to justify the rule of law as if it
were an individual’s right based on its objective nature. However, the insistence that an objective legal analysis can create a static
and concrete society based on the rule of law ignores the fluid nature of mankind and the progression of morality. An individual’s
autonomy, Unger argues, is the key to truly defining human moral needs on a meta-ethical level. Moral needs will become
empirically verifiable with enough time and space, and freedom to define morality without the influence of an hierarchical
society.
37Gabel,

Peter, and Paul Harris. "Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law." Review
of Law and Social Change XI (1982): 369-411.
38

Gabel, Peter, and Paul Harris. "Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law." Review
of Law and Social Change XI (1982): 369-411.
39

Hager, Mark. "Book Review Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, By Mark Kelman." The American
University Law Review 37 (1988): 1051-53.
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a position to know better.”40 The author also argues that Critical Legal Theory acknowledges the
injustice and inequality preserved by liberalism theory, and it “cannot succeed in its drive to
create a stable, self-consistent rule-governed order.”41 Therefore, the formalist theory of
objectivity will someday reveal an inability to pragmatically produce the consistent stability it
aims to achieve; subsequently resulting in a requirement for a new purpose for law, which
Critical Legal Theory suggests will be one of an egalitarian nature. Consequently, the
acknowledgement of liberal legal theory’s imminent demise is not nihilistic, but rather a
preemptive prediction based on the post-positivist recommendation that it be superseded with an
egalitarian purpose.
Finally, some critics contended that similar contradictions identified with liberalism
burden Critical Legal Theory and its methodology. 42 Critical Legal Theory applies a structuralist
critique of law by arguing that legal liberalism may one day crumble under the weight of the
very structure it created because of the contradicting nature of the societal structure and the
adherence to the neutrality of law. However, critics argued that a Critical Legal theorist would be
unable to be an “outside” observer and would fall victim to the same structuralist constraints
created by being a member of the society. James Boyle responds to this criticism by suggesting
an “immanent criticism” methodology, which allows a Critical Legal scholar to examine claims
of “correctness, naturalness, and neutrality” without having to produce a “pure truth” as

40Id.

41

1053.

Id. 1061.

42

Boyle, James. "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought." University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 133, no. 4 (1985): 729.
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rebuttal.43 Therefore, this Critical Legal method allows a scholar to argue against legal liberalism
by describing a pre-existing structure without having to provide a possible solution that may be
tainted by the theorist’s own subjective constraints.
The “radical” nature of Critical Legal Theory is not cause for its dismissal; rather, its
radical nature, if adopted as having certain “truths” about humanity, and can lead to significant
social changes. If the societal goal becomes the forming of a more altruistic social structure over
the current individualistic structure then American society will begin to allow individuals the
freedom to be democratic participants and to strive toward an egalitarian structure. This goal of a
society free from the inequalities formed by a hierarchal structure must first begin with the
acknowledgement of law’s subjectivity and its role in maintaining an alienating status quo.
The use of an activist judiciary to reach Critical Legal Theory’s primary objective is
emphatically rebuked by Scalian-Originalism’s theory and method. However, this thesis will
critique the legitimacy of Justice Scalia’s decisions from the Critical Legal understanding that all
judicial decisions are subjective, which allows for even an Originalist judge to play the role of an
activist adjudicator. Next, this manuscript will explain the method used to analyze ScalianOriginalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause, and
operationalize the terms legitimate and illegitimate from a Critical Legal perspective.

43Boyle,

James. "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought." University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 133, no. 4 (1985): 746-51.

14

METHOD
This manuscript applied the method of an immanent critique to analyze seventeen of
Justice Scalia’s First Amendment freedom of speech cases. The analysis began by giving each
case a fair and neutral reading in an attempt to find themes within the cases. When it became
apparent that there were certain thematic topics within the facts of the cases each legal
proceeding was then placed into one of the two corresponding categories: political speech and
non-political speech. These two primary categories were applied for two reasons. First, this
categorization mirrors formal legal analysis, which argues that political speech should receive a
heightened level of First Amendment protection, and therefore should be examined from a
stricter level of scrutiny. This form of analysis would be a familiar style of classification, and
would likely garner a greater level of support from normative legal scholars. Second, classifying
the cases into two large and encompassing categories simplified further analyses of the facts of
the cases. As a result, this distribution revealed three political speech classifications: employee
speech, anonymous speech, and campaign finance as a form political expression and identified
two subcategories for non-political speech: moral speech and cases regarding time, place, and
manner restrictions.
Once compartmentalized according to the facts of the case, Scalia’s rulings in each
case were analyzed for consistency in respect to the level of protection certain types of speech
were afforded by the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause according to ScalianOriginalism. Next, an analysis was performed on each ruling to determine if Scalia’s decision
was legitimate or illegitimate according to a Critical Legal perspective. For the purpose of this
analysis Scalia’s ruling in each case will be considered legitimate if the outcome produced serves
to create a more equitable society and/or allows American citizens a greater level democratic
15

participation. If the ruling fails to meet these criteria and/or sanctions the subjugation of persons
and/ or denies the right of sovereignty for individuals seeking protection under the First
Amendment the ruling will be deemed illegitimate.
Subsequently, a postliminary analysis will be performed if Scalian-Originalism’s
rulings are found to be simultaneously legitimate and illegitimate. This examination will attempt
to distinguish any routinely underlying themes that may demonstrate a consistency within
Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause. It is the
aspiration of this manuscript to provide a workable scheme for future legal analysis concerning
the predictable outcome of a Scalian-Originalist’s ruling based on the facts presented in a First
Amendment freedom of speech case.
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Chapter III: Context

Before applying this immanent critique method to analyze of Scalian-Originalism’s
interpretation of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause Scalian-Originalism as a
theory and methodology must be adequately examined. In the next chapter, this manuscript will
define Scalian-Originalism, review liberal normative theory for the First Amendment, and
explain how Critical Legal Theory correlates with both.
DEFINING SCALIAN-ORIGINALISM
Originalism as a theory and methodology is in a constant state of renaissance, evolving
under criticisms and its champions’ desire for survival. Understanding Originalism requires to
first understand what it is not. The term “Originalism” has become the comprehensive umbrella
for all judicial theories and methodologies that opposes the living constitution or “loose
construction” judicial practices. Sometimes

referred to as “pragmatic,” “noninterpretivist,”

“nonoringinalist” or “realist” the interpretative theory of living constitutionalism is, at its
essence, the theory of an evolving constitutional meaning that holds no a piori privilege to the
intentions of the framers or a particular time frame.44 Rather, it aims to interpret the constitution
by applying a “moral reading,” which utilizes a normative constitutional set of values, “including
democracy, the rule of law, liberal individualism, justice, and social welfare, also among
others.”45 As a methodology, living constitutionalism gives supremacy to stare decisis, which is

44Goldford,
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the common law approach founded in statutory precedent and tradition.

46

Originalism

emphatically rebukes this theory and method. Conversely, Originalism adheres to an antithetical
theory and method for interpreting the Constitution.
Modern Originalism is the method of adjudication born as a response to what was
deemed to be overly liberal rulings from the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren. 47 It
was born from the political discourse initiated by the Reagan administration, specifically
Attorney General Edwin Meese, who in his 1985 speech before the American Bar Association
called for judicial restraint from the Supreme Court in the form of an Originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation.48 Originalism in its broadest form is entrenched with the theory of
judicial restraint, which demands that judges not base rulings on their own personal moral
reading of the Constitution.49 Instead, an Originalist judge must always defer first to the text of
the Constitution and its “plain meaning.” If ambiguities arise from the plain meaning of the text,
an Originalist must prioritize, over modern understandings, the intentions and interpretations of
the framers and ratifiers,50 or at least the understood meaning of the Constitution during the
ratifying era.51 The theory of Originalism contends that the supremacy of the Constitution as
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rule of law makes the framers of the document, those who ratified it, and layman of the late
eighteenth century the definitive voice of interpretation for the Constitution.52 The methodology
relies first on the use of dictionary definitions to interpret the text53and second on a judge’s
historical analysis of the relatively fixed understanding of the text during ratification.54 To be
stated in a simplistic manner, Originalism as a broad term defines constitutional interpretation
adverse to that of a living constitutionalism. It is the use of semantic textual analysis and
historicism to anchor modern constitutional theory to the era of the framing and ratification of
the Constitution.
This expansive definition is rather large and all encompassing. It allows any judge to
claim an Originalist perspective without having to adhere to a strict methodology. This lack of
defined methodology contradicts Originalism’s claim for a higher level of judicial restraint.
Furthermore, the use of historical and textual analysis is not distinctively and solely an
Originalist approach. The Court has seen a rise in textual interpretations through the use of
dictionary definitions from both living constitutionalist and Originalist.55

Even living

constitutionalist, such as Justice Stephen Breyer, rely on historical analysis to determine cases.56
This broad definition allows for à la carte Originalism, meaning that an Originalist judge could
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claim to be a staunch Originalist, even if they applied their own personal moral reading to an
issue, as long as they find some historical evidence to back their claim. This quandary requires
an Originalist judge, much like a living constitutionalist judge, to further lay out the framework
for their interpretative method and theory.
To combat the overly broad definition, this thesis will define four distinctive types of
Originalism based on terms historians, legal scholars, and political theorist, who argue on behalf
of and against Originalism, commonly used interchangeably under the umbrella term of
Originalism when describing the contemporary judicial jurisprudence other than living
constitutionalism. Research has yielded that the terms “textualist,” “strict construction,” “original
intent,” and “original meaning,” have been used loosely and synonymously to describe Justice
Scalia and other Originalist judges. The use of these terms interchangeably further legitimizes
Originalism. This practice buttresses the false notion that modern Originalism has a longstanding position within the Court and legal discourse. However, as previously mentioned,
today’s Originalism is a relatively new interpretative theory that gained momentum in the
1980s.57

Also, using these terms interchangeably further legitimizes Originalism from a

formalist perspective because it implies that all forms of Originalism are objective in nature
though, pragmatically only two have the potential to be. Categorizing these four distinctive
approaches to Originalism into two avenues of interpretation “objective,” and “subjective”58
helps clarify this argument.
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The objective approach is far more constraining on judges as it requires that the
Originalist judge interpret the Constitution based solely on the semantic understanding of the
Constitution. A Textual-Originalist and Strict-Construction Originalist would fit into this
category because these approaches leave little room for interpretation, but rather require a judge
to simply play the role of enforcer for the Constitution. Originalists laud this limited ability for
interpretation because they believe judicial restraint is required to uphold the legitimacy of the
Court.

However, this may appear to be an idealistic theory that cannot be supported

pragmatically by its method.
The subjective approach allows for an Originalist judge to interpret the Constitution as
those who were alive, be it the framer, ratifiers, or general public, during its creation and
adoption intended or understood it to mean. Original-Intent and Original-Meaning Originalism
would fall under this category. Furthermore, this category is arguably the one in which most
modern Originalist would align with when interpreting the Constitution.59 However, it should be
noted that some Originalist judges, like Originalist enthusiast Robert Bork, have argued that the
latest version of Original-Meaning Originalism is in fact objective rather than subjective because
the approach is bound strictly to the ratifying generation.60 This argument fails to persuade
critics because Original-Meaning judges are bound only to a particular timeframe; they are free
to choose which sources from this period they can draw historical evidence from and which
source they can ignore. The ability to make Original-Meaning Originalism malleable to the will

59Rakove,

Jack N. "The Perils of Originalism." In Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. New
York: A.A. Knopf, 1996.
60

Perry, Michael J. "The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation." Virginia Law Review 77, no. 4
(1991): 669-719.

21

of its judge makes this approach subjective rather than objective.
When the four previously mentioned approaches to Originalism are clearly defined the
argument of an objective and subjective avenue for Originalism is supported. By providing a
framework that illustrates how these approaches differ both methodologically and theoretically it
will become clear how Scalian-Originalism is defined as the subjective Original-Meaning
interpretive approach, which is the latest approach in the modern evolution of Originalism.
Therefore, by framing modern Originalism in this manner a different schema is provided through
which to critique Originalism.
One of the earliest examples of Originalism is the subjective form of Original-Intent
Originalism. Denis J. Goldford writes that it is the “regulative theory wherein interpretation is
bound substantively by the intent of the framers.”61 It demands that judges first look to the
written text of the Constitution, and if there remains ambiguity within the text, then the
manifested intent of the framing generation, those who drafted and ratified the document,
supersedes all other understandings of the text. This theory and methodology gained momentum
under the helm of Justice Hugo Black, a liberal justice who supported civil liberties and was a
staunch defender of the First Amendment while serving as Associate Justice on the Supreme
Court from 1937 to 1971.62 He argued in favor of the “absolutes” held within the Bill of Rights,
and claimed that any limitations placed on those absolutes were akin to the “English doctrine of
legislative omnipotence.”
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that the framers were men of infallible character. Therefore, their intentions should be discerned
and given a priori status over all other interpretations. Black wrote:
It is my belief that there are “absolutes” in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there
on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be
“absolutes.” The whole history and background of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, as I
understand it, belies the assumption or conclusion that our ultimate constitutional
freedoms are now more than our English ancestors had when they came to this new land
to get new freedoms. The historical and practical purposes of the Bill of Rights, the very
use of a written constitution, indigenous to America, the language the Framers used, the
kind of three-department government they took pains to set up, all point to the creation of
a government which has denied all power to do some things under any and all
circumstances, and all power to do other things except precisely in the manner
prescribed.64
Original-Intent Originalist rely on the written works of the framers, as defined loosely as
men who played a prominent role in the birth of America as a self-governing country. These
Originalists rely primarily on the works of Jefferson and Madison, though there were fifty-five
founders who drafted the constitution, and ninety more men drafted the Bill of Rights.
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constitution binds its citizens to the law as it was understood by the authority that created it.”66
This premise supported the argument that Originalism was founded on the need for judicial
restraint because an Originalist judge would be forced to remove their own preferences and
desires from any rulings, instead deferring to the preferences and intentions of the framers.
Original-Intent Originalism, as practiced by those in the judiciary, such as Justice Black, helped
create the foundation for the arguments made by the objective forms of Originalism known as
Textualism and Strict-Constructionism.
Textualism can be defined as the theory of legal interpretation that holds the “plain
meaning” of the written word in supremacy.67In its purest form it requires fidelity solely to the
written word and the explicit semantic understanding of the text.68 The methodology relies on
authoritative sources, such as dictionaries and concrete grammatical rules that were in circulation
during the time of adoption to interpret constitutional and statutory law.

69

This approach is

highly objective because it in no way takes into account the context or intent of the text. The
rigid boundaries of Textualism make it the forerunning approach for champions of judicial
restraint because it leaves little to no room for a judge to participate in judicial activism.
However, while this approach is considered analogous with Originalism this theoretical and
methodological approach is not, by its nature, exclusively Originalist or non-Originalist since
both schools of constitutional interpretation have been known to dabble with it. This approach is
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most often applied by judges from both interpretive schools because of its apolitical nature and
overwhelming constraints of interpretation.

Furthermore, this approach may be sound in

theoretical and hypothetical practice, but it is rarely, if ever, used without some subjective
context parlayed in support of the textual reading.70 Consequently, this approach is most often
used as a starting point rather than the sole systematic approach for interpretation. Textualism is
the beginning platform for its objective kin, Strict-Constructionism.
Like a Textualist judge, a Strict-Constructionist judge is bound to the legal text. There is
no attempt to understand the “spirit,” or “presumed outcome,” of the text, but rather a StrictConstructionist is bound to enforcing the semantic meaning of only the written word.
Nonetheless, while they mirror each other in theory they differ in method. A StrictConstructionist is not constrained by “authoritative texts,” rather such a judge is at liberty to
infuse his or her own historical understanding when interpreting a legal text.71 This content
based approach does not support the judicial perspective that the Constitution contains certain
judicial derivations to be gleaned, and that these fundamental rights, such as privacy,72 though
not enumerated in the text, are still enforceable by the Constitution.73Though this approach bends
more than Textualism, it is still objective and still places a lot of constraint on the judiciary.
These objective approaches to law are theoretical in nature because in its application
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Textualism fails in its “purest form,” meaning that the law is constructed without some level of
subjectivity.74 The inability for objective Originalism to be sustained in a practical and realistic
manner would help explain why modern Originalism applies these approaches in only the most
nominal way; instead, modern Originalism favors the subjective avenues of interpretation. The
objective approaches predate modern Originalism, and is the foundation for Originalism’s
argument of legitimacy. As a result, these approaches, in many ways, particularly due to the
Originalist doctrine of objective judicial restraint, are the launching pads for modern
Originalism.
Original-Intent Originalism fell out of favor with subjective Originalist judges, as the rise
of objective forms of Originalism became prominent in the political discourse. Both forms play a
role as the precursors to the ascendant modern model, Original-Meaning Originalism, or ScalianOriginalism.75 Original-Meaning Originalism scholar Randy Barnett argues that this
transformation was required in order for Originalism to survive and gain its current level of
legitimacy. He argues that due in part to the critiques that Original-Intent was unworkable and
counter-intuitive to the actual intentions of the framers, the Original-Meaning model was created
as a more sustainable methodology.76
Justice Scalia defined modern Originalism as, “the interpretative approach we endorse is
that of the ‘fair reading’: determining the application of the governing text to given facts on the
basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language would have understood the text
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at the time it was issued.”

77

As a methodology the Original-Meaning model relies on seventy

rules of statutory interpretation, or canons of construction. 78 These rules are meant to remove a
judge’s personal moral reading from the text and force the judge to adhere to the doctrine of
judicial restraint. Original-Meaning Originalists may vary in theory from Original-Intent
Originalists, but in practice they are fairly similar.79
Like its predecessor, Original-Intent Originalism, the Original-Meaning model is
grounded in the eighteenth century. Both require historical research and analysis to support
rulings. While giving authority to the text, neither method is bound solely to the textual
definition, but rather a judge is allowed to chose the historical content through which to interpret
the Constitution, which serves to cloak Originalism in the idea of fairness and objectivity. This is
known as the practice of law office history, which is the practice of composing “a plausible
historical defense of a result desired on undisclosed grounds.”80 Furthermore, both approaches
claim to be champions of judicial restraint, and to argue in favor of reverse stare decisis in
matters that do not, in their opinion, align with the original understanding of the Constitution.
Consequently, these two models have similar strengths and weakness based on their subjective
nature, and from a pragmatic perspective it can be difficult to discern the two.
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SCALIAN-ORIGINALISM AND CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY
Richard Posner wrote that, “Judges are not competent historians.”81 He argued that
the indeterminacy of historiography and the malleability of history to bend to a particular judge’s
predisposed will creates a dubious form of historical analysis endorsed by Scalian-Originalism.
His argument against law-office history challenges the method in which Scalia utilizes history in
his rulings. Also, he questions the justifiable use of eighteenth-century history to interpret
modern law. The latter argument questioning the supremacy of eighteenth-century morality to
modern moral beliefs is supported by Critical Legal Theory.82
In the last two centuries, and more specifically the last century, American society has
made strides toward equality for all, particularly people of color and women. It is a sociological
fact that the American culture has historically favored white men, especially those with wealth.83
Also, it is understood, as critical historian Walter Benjamin writes, that traditional historicism
empathizes with the victor; “Hence, empathy with the victor invariably benefits the rulers.”84
Consequently, Scalia’s application of eighteenth-century history, which undeniably favored
white elite men because it was written for them and by them, is bound to be riddled with biases
and prejudices that would serve only to further the agenda of those in power at that time of the
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ratification of the Constitution. Scalia insists on relying on the founding era’s understanding of
the Constitution in an attempt to restrain a judge’s subjectivity. From a Critical Legal perspective
Scalian-Originalism is maintaining a status quo that alienates large portions of American society
due to the discriminating hierarchical structure of the society in the eighteenth century.
Therefore, Scalia’s use of history, whether or not he manipulates it to support his predisposed
position, is erroneous because it fails to further every individual’s goal of autonomy through
individual political power.
The second liberal critique of Scalian-Originalism is that it is not, as it claims to be,
objective.85 Scalia claims that the Constitution must be interpreted as it was understood to mean
when it was ratified. This approach makes law predictable and prevents judges from doing
whatever they like.86 The rule of law doctrine intends to create “fairness” within the law by
forcing judges to divorce themselves from subjectivity. A judge would not be making arbitrary
rulings, but rather would be bound to a predetermined outcome. Originalism has gained support
due to its claim of objectivity; though even formalists acknowledge that it fails to practice
objectivity in every case.87 Supporters of Originalism approach the subjective nature of ScalianOriginalism as if were a regrettable byproduct in certain cases where the Originalist method and
theory were not strictly adhered to by the person applying it. They argue that, with the
understanding that the rule of law is the epitome of liberal jurisprudence, objectivity is possible.
Thus, Originalism can be altered in such a way as to make it a neutral method for constitutional
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interpretation.88 Other formalists acknowledge the subjective nature of Scalian-Originalism, but
argue that it is not a viable method based on its subjective nature’s inability to produce consistent
and predictable outcomes. They argue that legal reality can be grounded in the Constitution’s
ability to enforce a neutral law created through its text, but Originalism fails to do this. 89 This
critique continues to support the rule of law doctrine, while dismissing Scalian-Originalism.
Critical Legal Theory embraces the subjective nature of Scalian-Originalism because it
denies the possibility for any legal method to be objective. Critical Legal Studies is able to
critique Scalian-Originalism on the merits of what it is, and not on the merits of what it is not.
Using Critical Legal Theory to critique the legitimacy of Scalian-Originalism based on its ability
to serve the societal interests of egalitarianism, and greater democratic participation will allow
for a new perspective on Scalian-Originalism. Furthermore, a Critical Legal perspective can also
help assess Scalian-Originalism’s ability to produce predictable meta-ethical moral outcomes. As
a result of not focusing on the fact that Scalian-Originalism is not objective, it becomes possible
to critique its legitimacy based on what Scalian-Originalism currently is, and not on what it
should be.
Having explained how Critical Legal Theory will examine Scalian-Originalism this
manuscript will now briefly leave the subject of Scalian-Originalism. In the next section it will
be explained how liberal First Amendment doctrine and Critical Legal Theory work together
toward the common goal of autonomy.

Finally, the manuscript will return to Scalian-

Originalism and examine its interpretation of the First Amendment from a Critical Legal
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perspective.
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Anthony Lewis writes, “Freedom to speak and write as you wish is an inescapable
necessity of democracy.”90 The argument that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech is the
foundation for liberty within the American society is pervasively ingrained in the current
political consciousness, and this understanding has been touted as a universal truth.91 Critical
Legal theorists deny that there is any “universal democratic ideal.”92 However, the argument that
individuals must be free to make choices that allow for egalitarianism to occur, implies that an
individual must have access to competing ideas. Accordingly, a Critical Legal theorist can use
the modern understanding of the First Amendment as a tool to further the goal of equality and
democratic participation. The two schools are in agreement that an individual’s ability to
communicate freely is imperative for autonomy to be achieved. The theory of a need for selfgovernment, which both formalist and Critical Legal theorist can agree upon, is not explicitly
guaranteed in the First Amendment. This allows for judges, who maintain legal legitimacy by
interpreting the law and then enforcing it, to perpetuate the movement toward a societal structure
not based on hierarchal rule. The concept of changing society’s structure through judicial
activism is not as radical as it first appears. After all, the contemporary normative freedom of
speech doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court’s “mysterious and remarkable process” to
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change the interpretation of fundamental law. 93
The Constitution, and more specifically the Bill of Rights, like all forms of law, is
political in nature. The Bill of Rights was born from the Anti-Federalists’ fears of a federal
government centralizing power. The Federalists’ conceded to Anti-Federalists’ demands in order
to ratify the Constitution. This concession resulted in the Federalist agreeing to the AntiFederalist vigorous campaigns for citizens to be granted “unalienable” rights protected by law. 94
Finally, this process culminated with the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
with no discernible way to enforce the citizenry’s new rights. The Supreme Court would
eventually assume the role of Constitutional interpreter and enforcer though this role was not
explicitly laid out in the Constitution.
The First Amendment was written ambiguously by the colonial elites with their own
agendas to support and protect. There was no clear-cut understanding of its intentions, or who it
was meant to protect, but it certainly did not include protection for everyone. Thomas Emerson
writes, “Slaves were obviously excluded, and women did not seem to matter.”95 In his seminal
article, Legacy of Suppression, historian Leonard Levy argued, “There is even reason to believe
that the Bill of Rights was more the chance product of political expediency on all sides than of
principled commitment to personal liberties.”96 The nullification of the freedom of speech and
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press clauses of the First Amendment with the Federalists’ Alien and Sedition Act of 1798,
which restricted speech critical of the government, supports Levy’s argument of political
expediency. The Alien and Sedition Act was never found unconstitutional based on the First
Amendment, rather it just expired. The lack of First Amendment protection against the 1798
Alien and Sedition Act supports the argument that the Bill of Rights was a political tool of the
framers and ratifiers in an attempt to unify the country under the Constitution. Understanding the
nature of the Bill of Rights as a political ploy for the elites of the time period to protect their own
interest dispels the sentimentality regarding the benevolence of the framers and ratifiers who
wrote the Bill of Rights. The ability to understand the political nature of the First Amendment
facilitates a deeper understanding of how modern freedom of speech doctrine came to be a
champion and defender for individual autonomy.
Upon its conception the First Amendment applied exclusively to the federal government.
The passing of Alien and Sedition Acts proved it carried very little weight even within that level
of government. Following the Civil War and the subsequent ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which allowed for the Constitution to become the supreme law of the land by
incorporating the Bill of Rights on a state level, the modern freedom of speech doctrine began
emerging. However, the contemporary concept of freedom of speech as an individual’s right to
pursue a state of self-government did not occur until the twentieth century.
The First Amendment as a right afforded to each American citizen was not made
applicable to the states until after World War I.97 Prior to the Gitlow case, free-speech claims
seldom made it to the Supreme Court, and if they did make it, the Court seemed more concerned
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with defining ways that the state could limit speech rather than protecting speech. 98 In 1931 the
Court began enforcing a constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech with the case Stromberg
v. California.99 Following this case the Supreme Court was tasked with the duty of interpreting
what the words of the First Amendment meant on a case-by-case basis. By the mid-twentieth
century, particularly under the Warren Court, protection of free speech began to take hold both
within the judiciary and the public. The evolution of free speech from essentially nonexistent to a
revered individual right occurred relatively quickly due to “judicial activism,” which allowed for
judges to work outside the vacuum of the law to shape and be shaped by the public’s demand for
protection of speech.100 The ability of judges to completely reshape the foundation of the First
Amendment supports Critical Legal theorists Gabel and Harris who argue for the use of the
judicial system to further egalitarian goals because it has the political power to do so.
Anthony Lewis argues that the use of the First Amendment to strive toward equality is a,
“powerful testimony to the crucial role of judges in the political system that rests on the
foundation of law.”101 By daring to challenge the status quo, the Supreme Court created a new
understanding of a democratic society that required it citizens to be allowed to challenge those
with power. It became the normative thought that democracy had to be protected, and that its
citizens had a right to pursue the truth in an attempt to become more enlightened and active
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within the democratic society.
Prominent legal philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn argues that the First Amendment is
an absolute in the sense that it guarantees American citizens the ability to self-govern. The ability
to self-govern, he contends, is a core concept of a true democratic society. Meiklejohn argues
that with regards to political speech the First Amendment must be an absolute in order to allow
for the creation of an informed electorate that cannot be manipulated by those in power who wish
to hinder self-government. Meikeljohn does not believe that all forms of speech, such as libel,
slander, and obscenity should be protected because the First Amendment does not guarantee the
absence of regulation, but protects that “presence of self-government.” He states that the purpose
of First Amendment is to allow the people of the United States the democratic autonomy and
authority to govern themselves by limiting the powers of the government to censor speech.102
Thomas Emerson agrees that “ freedom of expression is necessary to a democratic
political process,”103 but argues that the First Amendment must protect more than an individual’s
right to self-government in order to advance individual liberty. Emerson proclaims that freedom
of expression must go beyond the political realm if it is to allow humanity to be active
participants in shaping their own democratic experience and destiny. According to Emerson
there are four intentions of the First Amendment that must be adhered to in order to reach an
ideal democratic society. The first intention is known as the “market place of ideas” rationale,
which states that the First Amendment is meant to allow individuals to protect themselves from
falsities when trying to advance knowledge and discover the “truth.” This rationale contends
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that American citizens have to be allowed to hear and analyze competing ideas in order to find
the “truth.” The second intention mirrors Meikeljohn’s theory of self-government, which
requires individuals to be allowed freedom of expression in order to reach their own judgments
and arrive at a common decision. The third intention is a “form of social control that strikes a
balance in society between stability and movement, thereby allowing for necessary change
without resort to violence.”104 This is known as the freedom of political expression rationale,
and has allowed some judges to argue that political speech deserves “special protections.” 105 The
final intention Emerson attributes to the First Amendment is the need of an individual to achieve
personal fulfillment through freedom of speech.106 These rationales have become the normative
liberal argument for the protection of freedom of speech. Even though they are built on
“democratic ideals” their goals of creating an enlightened, autonomous, and active democracy
resonate well with the goals of Critical Legal Theory.
Though both liberal theory and Critical Legal Theory share similar goals, the role judges
play in progressing the citizenry toward individual self-government differ. For formalists the role
of the judge is to create a concrete rationale for what forms of speech are protected. From a
Critical Legal perspective the division of private and public avenues for speech created by the
hierarchy requires judges to interpret free-speech cases on a case-by-case basis.107 The Court is
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supposed to act as a protector for those traditionally alienated by the structure of society. Cases
are to be decided in such a manner as to allow citizens to challenge the status quo and to allow
all voices equal access to the democratic process. Therefore, the legitimacy of free-speech cases
is determined by each case’s capacity to facilitate social equality. Scalian-Originalism’s
interpretation of the First Amendment will be examined by applying this criterion.
SCALIAN-ORIGINALISM, CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
On September 25, 1954, Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren was the key note
speaker at the Marshall-Wythe Blackstone Commemoration Ceremony. Standing in the College
Yard of Virginia’s William and Mary College, Warren gave his first public speech since the
landmark ruling of Brown v. Board of Education. Warren praised Chief Justice John Marshall
for building a strong foundation for constitutional law based on the wisdom of William
Blackstone. Warren argued that Marshall’s decisions at times “aroused a storm of protest as
being beyond the words and intent of the Constitution,” but that his courageous efforts to reach
for a perfect form of justice allowed him, and future generations, to reach for a judicial and
governmental system, “which is premised upon freedom and the dignity of the individual.”
Noting that mistakes had been made along the way, Warren argued that the Court was to
reevaluate and at times “wipe that slate clean,” in order to continue advancing towards a more
just society. 108 Warren’s understanding of the purpose of the Supreme Court and his actions
regarding the First Amendment, which broadened individual liberties of freedom of speech,
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contributed to his label as an “activist” judge. However, Warren’s attempt to use the Court’s
authority to create a more equal and democratic society, regardless of its driving activist
nature, is an honorable, and arguably necessary, function of the Supreme Court according to
Critical Legal Theory. Warren’s actions resonate with Critical Legal Studies assertion that
judges have the ability to, and should, use their authoritative power to balance the scales
regarding historically disenfranchised members of the American society even if this leads to
momentary destabilization and reverse stare decisis.109
The Critical Legal Studies criteria for the determination of legal legitimacy are the
antithesis of the modern liberal archetype of legal legitimacy. Formalist legal perspectives have
used the activist label with a negative connotation, implying that judicial activism would ruin
the very fabric of the American legal system. 110 From the normative standpoint, acts of judicial
activism, such as that of the Warren Court, are overstepping the judicial boundaries requiring
restraint. The response to judicial activism was the accession of the method of judicial review
known as Originalism, which intended to bring order, stability, and credibility back to the
Court.111
Original-Intent Originalism received criticism and scrutiny almost immediately. 112
Legal scholars began to argue that from a liberal perspective Originalism lacked legitimacy
because it was indeterminate, and there was not enough historical evidence to definitively
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argue the intentions of the framers. 113 Also, there was the “dissensus critique,” which argued
that the framers had no authority to create binding laws. 114 Scholars also pointed out that legal
practitioners are not trained historians; therefore, their historical analysis could be flawed or
self serving.115 Finally, critics argued that Original-Intent Originalism was anachronistic and
since the framing generation itself did not use this approach, certainly a modern generation
should follow suit.116 Under such criticisms, as well as others, Original-Intent Originalism was
revitalized through Original-Meaning Originalism.
This resurgence is not without its own set of liberal critiques. Mathew D. Bunker points
out that both Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Antonin Scalia are both subscribers to
Original-Meaning Originalism but on First Amendment issues they are greatly divided. 117 He
concludes that Original-Meaning Originalism, “may create at least as many problems as it
solves.”118 One glaring issue Bunker highlights is that Original-Meaning Originalism, or
Scalian-Originalism, does not restrain a judge any more than the opposing methods. The
justices’ use of the “reasonable person” assessment gives them a great deal of latitude when
finding historical sources, which “presumably, congenial to the judge’s own preference.” 119
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Many scholars both supporters and detractors of Scalian-Originalism agree that a
judge’s personal beliefs and morals play a large part in their decision making process.
Originalist supporter David Barton argued that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
clause was written to protect words not actions and behaviors, which the modern doctrine of
freedom of expression protects. 120 Barton argues this expansion of the freedom of speech
clause allows the judiciary to enshrine, “acts formerly forbidden, and still abhorred by the
citizenry.”121 Scalia does not agree with Barton’s definition of speech and has supported, to
some degree, freedom of expression, which would make Scalia an historical revisionist judge,
not an Originalist, according to Barton. However, Justice Scalia conceded that he is not
exclusively an Originalist judge, and that at times the method of Originalism just does not
apply.122 In his now famous 1988 Taft Lecture, entitled Originalism: The Lesser of Evils,
Justice Scalia defends his stance that the Original-Meaning Originalist interpretation of the
Constitution is superior to any other method because it advocates for the rule of law as the law
of rules approach.123 Justice Scalia proclaimed that he is a “faint-hearted” Originalist, who
will resort to modern understandings in cases where it is difficult to discern the clear original
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legal meaning or fails to adhere to the rule of law approach. 124 Scalia’s own assertion of his
need to opt out of an Originalist perspective when the method fails to produce a ruling
demonstrates the methods subjective attributes and ability to sanction the practice law office
history.
Scalia’s “faint-hearted” Originalism is addressed by another Originalist supporter
Randy E. Barnett in his article Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Fainted-Hearted”
Originalism. Barnett argues that there are three ways in which Scalia retracts from an
Originalist perspective. First, he argues that Scalia abandons Originalism when he finds
portions of the Constitution that do not mesh well with his understanding of the rule of law. 125
Second, he will follow prior precedent that contradicts the Constitution’s original meaning if
the outcome is objectionable. 126 As a final point, Barnett argues that Scalia, when he cannot
justify his ruling using one of the previous avenues, abandons Originalism in cases where the
outcome of an Originalist ruling, “he and most others would find too onerous by some unstated
criteria.”127 After examining cases where Scalia discards an Originalist viewpoint, Barnett
delivers a final argument that Justice Scalia is not an Originalist judge, and by not adhering to
the Constitution’s original meaning in all cases Scalian-Originalism fails to garner
Constitutional legitimacy. 128
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Opponents of Originalism agree with Barnett’s narrative and critique of ScalianOriginalism. Robert M. Howard and Jeffery A. Segal concur that in his court opinions Scalia
does not always practice an Originalist approach. 129 The authors decided to examine the
systematic empirical validity of Originalism by examining briefs filed by litigants using an
Originalist argument of either text or intent over a period of eight years. Howard and Segal
reviewed these cases to see if an Originalist argument carried weight with an Originalist judge,
or if those judges appeared to rely on their own modern preferences and behave attitudinally. 130
They hypothesized that due to the lack electoral accountability, the fact that Supreme Court
Justices have reached the pinnacle career point in the judicial system, and that “humans are
utility maximizers,” it is likely that Justices would seek to maximize policy goals that coincide
with their predisposed positions. 131 The authors then categorized each Originalist brief into a
liberal or conservative ideology based on the content being argued. They found that Originalist
judges Scalia and Thomas sided with an Originalist argument less than half the time when
made by liberal parties, though they did support the liberal parties who made an Originalist
argument more often than the parties who did not use a textual claim. For conservative parties
the justices agreed with over half of their Originalist arguments, though they disagreed with
parties making an Originalist argument more often than conservative parties that did not
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petition on Originalist grounds.132 Therefore, the use of an Originalist argument did appear to
factor into the decisions of conservative justices when made by liberal parties, and enhance the
liberal party’s chance of receiving a favorable ruling more so than liberal parties who did not
use an Originalist argument, but it appeared to have little effect on conservative parties who
used the same method. However, when the liberal and conservative case briefs were combined
the textual and intentional arguments did not appear to have “any significant impact on any of
the Justices.”133 These findings did not discredit justices who may firmly believe that they are
pursuing Originalist principles, but rather the results suggest, “that the originalist dream of a
neutral method of constitutional interpretation that can remove judicial bias remains illusory. ”
Instead, the results show that the ideological predispositions to vote a particular way
overwhelm decision making regardless of whether or not one applies an Originalist
interpretative method or some other vague notion of justice.” 134
Howard and Segal’s article, An Original Look at Originalism, offers an interesting
perspective on the normative legal arguments made by Barton and Barnett that ScalianOriginalism fails to create a predictable outcome based on Originalist ideals. This instability,
Barton and Barnett argued, made Scalian-Originalism an illegitimate method of constitutional
interpretation because it failed to meet the liberal legal standard of the rule of law. Rather,
Howard and Segal’s data suggest that the predictably of Scalian-Originalism is constructed by
Scalia’s predisposed political ideology, which shapes his Originalist method more so than a

132Howard,

133

Robert M., and Jeffery A. Segal. "An Original Look at Originalism." Law and Society Review 36, no. 1 (2002): 128.

Id. 130-31.

134Id.

133-34.

43

strict allegiance to a particular method for constitutional interpretation. These conclusions are
similar to other researchers’ results, such as those of Joshua Furgeson. Comparing federal law
clerks preferences and political ideologies, Furgeson found “a clear empirical relationship
between constitutional preferences and political orientation.” 135 Overall, the results showed
that liberal law clerks tended to prefer a current meaning method, while their conservative
counterparts tended to support the original meaning of the text methodology. 136 These findings
mirror the results found by Howard and Segal and further support the argument that the
methodology of Scalian-Originalism, which claims judicial restraint, is no more binding than
non-originalist methods. This argument would be sufficient for a liberal legal author to argue,
as they have, that Scalian-Originalism is illegitimate. However, from a Critical Legal
perspective these findings do not lead to a conclusion that Scalian-Originalism is illegitimate,
but rather support the inherent subjective nature of the judicial system. Critical Legal Studies
does not base the legitimacy of a constitutional interpretation on its predictability, nor, does
Critical Legal Theory even attempt to purport that judicial restraint is a necessity of judicial
review. In fact, Critical Legal Studies accepts that justices will have political biases, and that
they will make decisions based on their predisposed positions rather than the impractical ideal
of the supremacy of the rule of law.
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Having accepted the liberal legal argument that Scalian-Originalism is a method bound
by the justice’s predisposition and not by the strict adherence to the rule of law ScalianOriginalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment can be critiqued from a Critical Legal
perspective because if Scalian-Originalism simply held to the literal textual meaning, or even a
consistent method of decision making for every case, it would be hard to argue that it is
possibly a form of judicial activism. However, due to the method’s inconsistencies, which the
normative legal argument claims makes Scalian-Originalism illegitimate; it is possible from a
Critical Legal perspective that Scalian-Originalism is a legitimate form of constitutional
interpretation, provided that its rulings avow the goal of furthering equality and democratic
participation within American society.
Scholars such as Randy Barnett, David Barton, Eric Segall, etc., have researched Justice
Scalia’s application of Original-Meaning Originalism and included a diverse range of cases in
order to critique Scalian-Originalism from a broader vantage point. Some scholars, such as
Segall, included certain First Amendment cases in their research, but did not include every
freedom of speech case in which Scalia used an Originalist argument in his ruling.137 This
manuscript serves to look all seventeen of Scalia’s First Amendment freedom of speech cases
where an Originalist perspective was applied. In the next chapter Critical Legal analysis will be
conducted, in the form of an immanent critique, to examine the legitimacy of ScalianOriginalism as a constitutional interpretive method for the freedom of speech clause by
attempting to determine the ability of Scalia’s Originalist rulings in First Amendment cases to
create an equitable society and to advance democratic participation. The purpose of this
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research is to further the understanding of the applicable effects Scalian-Originalism has on the
definition and enforcement of the freedom of speech rights granted to the American citizenry
under the First Amendment.
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Chapter IV: Analysis

The only single overarching theme in Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First
Amendment is that it is not an absolute. The freedom of speech clause does limit the civil
liberties granted to the American public by the First Amendment. For the purpose of this
analysis each of the seventeen cases examined are categorized into one of four classifications:
employee speech, anonymous speech, campaign finance as a form of political expression, and
non-political speech.
SCALIAN-ORIGINALISM AND EMPLOYEE POLITICAL SPEECH
There are four cases of employee speech in which Scalian-Originalism has produced a
decision. Out of those cases, two pertain to freedom of speech rights for elected officials, and
two cases consider the speech rights of those employed by the state. From a Critical Legal
perspective, these four cases are a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate rulings. For cases
involving an elected officials’ freedom of speech the decisions are just. However, for cases in
which state employees seek First Amendment protections for political speech, ScalianOriginalism appears to favor those in power; thus, it fails to be equitable and to further
democratic participation.
When addressing the issue of Nevada’s recusal law, which required elected officials to
disqualify themselves in situations that a reasonable person may be “martially effected by,”
Scalian-Originalism ruled alongside the other eight justices in an unanimous decision upholding
recusal laws.138 In the case Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, city council member
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Michael A. Carrigan disclosed that his campaign manager had worked in the capacity as a
consultant for the Lazy 8 project, which sought to develop a casino/hotel. Carrigan then
proceeded to vote in favor of the Lazy 8 project’s land use request. The Nevada Commission of
Ethics investigated this vote and found that Carrigan had violated Nevada’s recusal law.
Subsequently, Carrigan was censured. Carrigan appealed his censure, and argued that he had a
First Amendment right to vote based on the freedom of speech clause. The Nevada Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Carrigan, citing that an elected official’s ability to vote on public issues is
protected by the First Amendment. After hearing arguments, the Supreme Court reversed this
decision and upheld Carrigan’s censure.139
Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia wrote that from an Originalist
perspective recusal laws were constitutional because they dated back to the founding and have
been enforced for more than 200 years. Furthermore, an elected official has a duty to the citizens
they serve. “The legislative power thus committed is not personal to the legislatures it belongs to
the people, the legislature has no personal right to it.”140 This argument that elected officials
should have a duty to the people above any self-interest is a way in which the Court attempts to
create equality among those in power and those they are meant to serve. This ambition of
fostering an altruistic society in which elected officials cannot abuse their power for personal
gain aligns with the critical objective of equality; and therefore, is admissible. Though ScalianOriginalism supports the abridgement of speech in the form of recusal laws, regarding elected
officials in an effort to ensure social equality and the lack of abuse of authority by said elected
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officials, it does not contend that elected officials, or those campaigning for an elected position,
must relinquish all forms of speech protected by the First Amendment.
In the case Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Gregory Wersal filed suit against the
state’s constitution’s announcement clause claiming that it violated the First Amendment. The
announcement clause forbade those seeking to be elected to the state’s Supreme Court from
discussing “disputed legal or political issues.” While as an associate justice candidate in 1996,
Wersal distributed several pieces of literature critical of numerous prior Minnesota Supreme
Court cases regarding issues such as abortion, crime, and welfare. A complaint was filed and
subsequently dismissed by the Lawyers Board after finding that the literature did not violate the
announcement clause. Wersal, however, withdrew from the race. Then in 1998 Wersal once
again ran for the same office, but this time he filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court
challenging the constitutionality of the announcement clause. “Wersal alleged that he was forced
to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point
where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that
he might run afoul of the announcement clause.”141 He argued that the clause caused him to
remain silent on important issues and that it was unconstitutional because it violated his freedom
of speech rights. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decision and Justice Scalia authored
the Court’s opinion.
Scalia wrote that the state’s interest in electing impartial judges was weakly defined and
not compelling enough to warrant the abridgment of a candidate’s speech.
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respondent’s argument of a long-standing tradition prohibiting judicial partisanship, Scalia
argued, was false. The movement towards non-partisan judicial elections is a relatively modern
phenomenon, and prior to the late nineteenth century, judicial candidates not only discussed,
“legal and political issues on the campaign trail, but they were touting party afflictions and
angling for party nominations all the while.”142 This did not harm the elections, but rather
assisted the voters by providing them with a totality of information from which to make an
informed choice for whom to cast a vote. “There is an obvious tension between the article of
Minnesota’s popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s announcement clause which places most subjects of interest to
the voters off limits.”143 Simply put, Scalian-Originalism lambasts Minnesota’s announcement
clause because it hinders the democratic participation of the voters, who are not given complete
information and are unable to make a fully educated vote. This ruling protects both the rights of
the speaker to inform the public, and the public’s right to participate in a candid election; thus,
making the decision balanced and fair from a Critical Legal perspective.
Scalian-Originalism has proven to be legitimate from a Critical Legal perspective on
issues regarding freedom of speech and elected officials. In both cases, the decisions served to
further equality and democratic participation. Where Scalian-Originalism begins to waiver and
tip the scales towards illegitimacy in matters of employees speech is on issues regarding the
abridgement of state employees’ First Amendment protections. For those who are not the upper
echelon and elected officials of the state, but rather the majority of subordinates, Scalian-
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Originalism supports the abridgment of an individual’s right to speech by condoning subsequent
punishment of unfavorable speech while simultaneously promoting accolades for encouraged
speech.
Keen A. Umbehr was an independent contractor for solid waste management for
Wasbaunsee County, Kansas from 1985 until 1991. He admitted that he was frequently critical of
the County’s Board of Commissioners, and he argued his criticisms caused the board to
terminate his contract. Umbehr sued the board alleging that his termination was retaliation for
his criticisms, which the First Amendment protected. Therefore, the board was in violation of
his freedom of speech rights by infringement. The district court granted a summary judgment to
the board, but the Tenth Circuit Court reversed that judgment. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Umbehr’s petition.144
In a 7-2 decision in favor of Umbehr the Court ruled that the First Amendment
shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination on the basis of what he might
have said about the board that they found unfavorable. Both Originalist justices Thomas and
Scalia dissented. Scalia argued that this ruling changes contract law and ignores a venerable and
accepted tradition of the government’s ability to contract any party they deem fit, and by
ignoring that long-standing tradition, the Court has created a slippery slope by allowing the
scrutiny of the government’s official contract practices. Essentially, Scalia is arguing that the
First Amendment has not historically protected a speaker from punishment; so why should it
start now? In fact, “the ability to discourage eccentric views through mild means that have
historically been employed, and that the Court has now set its face against, may well be
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important to social cohesion.”145 This reasoning fails to take into account three major aspects of
this case, which suggests the illegitimate nature of this ruling according to Critical Legal Studies.
First, Scalia’s dissent in Umbehr allows for the government to abridge a speaker’s
right to express “eccentric” views by permitting punishments for that speech. This Blackstonian
concept of prior restraint, which supports punishment for speech after the fact, but forbids only
prior censorship, is a deeply rooted First Amendment doctrine. However, the prior restraint
doctrine has led to a society willing to participate in self-censorship rather than face the possible
legal consequences and social sanctions that could result from speech deemed as unprotected by
the First Amendment.146 The ability to punish an activity will deter that activity; therefore the
government’s ability to punish an individual for recalcitrant speech hinders the speaker’s ability
to participate within American society for fear of reprisal. 147 William Mayton argues, “As a
result, the state gains an unconfined discretion to pick and choose the idea that it would smother
with the costs of subsequent punishment.”148 Therefore, the state is able to quell menacing
speech, and an individual’s right to democratic participation, simply by continuing to avow
foreboding consequences that could prove dire to an individual.
Second, the means deployed by the government in this case was an act that took away
Umberh’s economic stability by terminating his employment, which by any standards should not
be assumed to be “mild.” The state is basically given the authority to make an individual either
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practice self-censorship or accept termination. Wayne Sanders writes, “Dismissal is the most
common retaliation for speech.”149 Citizens have little or no recourse for termination based on
protected speech and will most likely refrain from speaking because of a number of factors that,
“decrease an employees’ mobility, specifically a long-term economic recession, deepening health
care problems, and the advent of two-career families.”150 The ability to severely punish an
individual by eliminating their economic livelihood for speaking in a manner that is troublesome
and possibly damaging can create a culture of silence that stunts democratic growth and
participation.
Finally, Scalian-Originalism is advocating for the abridging of unfavorable speech if it
disrupts social cohesion, suggesting that a speaker should first consider the likelihood of society
to agree with their statement prior to speaking, and if it may upset others the speaker should
refrain from speech. This argument has an ominous nature because, as Gordon Smith argues
“when an employee reveals wrong-doing or a breach of public trust, disruption is
inevitable,”151and this disruption could shake the foundation of societal cohesion. However, in
regard to public employees they are the members of the community “most likely to have
informed and definite opinions”152on matters of public concern; so, arguably it is their duty as
citizens of a democratic society to speak and inform the public.
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All three of these reasons, on their face, hinder an individual’s ability to participate
openly within a democratic society. The ability for an individual to speak without fear of severe
punishment is necessary in order to have a true “market place of ideas.” By supporting
punishment for protected political speech, and by allowing the government to terminate an
individual merely for speaking, Scalian-Originalism’s ruling in Umbehr, regarding a public
employee’s freedom of speech right, is illegitimate.
The support of severe punishment for an employee’s critical speech gains heightened
levels of concern regarding legitimacy when taking into account Scalian-Oringialism’s support
of the practice of political patronage. Patronage is defined as the exchange of discretionary
favors in lieu of political support.153 The case Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois addressed
this issue. In the fall of 1980 Illinois Governor James Thompson issued an order that prohibited
state officials from hiring new employees, recalling laid off employees, or promoting an
individual without the prior consent of the Governor’s Office of Personnel. This office made
employment decisions based on certain factors including the individual’s contributions to the
Republican Party, service to the party, and support of local party leaders. Cynthia B. Rutan and
several other potential and current employees filed suit challenging this patronage system stating
that this practice violated their First Amendment rights. In a split decision of 5-4 the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Rutan and found that the Governor’s practices were unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia dissented.154
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Scalia argued that the practice of patronage was a “venerable and accepted tradition,”
which supports the stability of a two-party system. The stability created by patronage far
outweighs the possible corruptive practices that may result from patronage, according to ScalianOriginalism. Furthermore, the practice of patronage did not hinder the democratic participation
of minority groups, but actually helped. This argument may very well be supported, as ScalianOriginalism contends, by a “long political tradition”;155 however, Scalia fails to properly support
the notion that patronage is an acceptable practice for any reason other than it has always been a
part of the American political system. From a Critical Legal perspective the possibility of
corruption introduced by the practice of political patronage far outweighs its stabilizing abilities.
In addition, the practice of political patronage for public employees wishing to progress in their
careers or even obtain employment would cause them to feel, “a significant obligation to support
political positions held by their superiors”,156and result in the erosion of a public employees’
right to free expression.
Political patronage serves the purpose of helping to further political agendas, and
allow for the ruling elites to enhance their organizational control,157 which makes it a powerful
tool for politicians, even for those who use it without nefarious reasons. Nevertheless, there are
societal costs associated with patronage practices. Richard L. Hansen’s research suggests that
even if patronage is not used in a manner of corruption the practice alone is enough to increase
the appearance of corruption, which has a negative impact on the public’s trust in the abilities of
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the government.158 He also found that patronage systems are less efficient than merit systems.159
Therefore, even if no quid pro quo corruption is practiced through patronage it is possible that
the practice will sour the public’s perception of the government and lead to inefficiencies, which
can harm the foundations of democracy.
The democratic ideal of the Right of Association may also be marred by the practice
of political patronage. Through a barrage of cases the Court found that the First Amendment
protects an individual’s right to have political associations with whomever they chose, and the
government cannot punish an individual directly or indirectly for their association without a
compelling interest.160 The interest of rewarding individuals for party affiliation, loyalty, or
activity is not a compelling one.161 Rather, the practice of political patronage is self-serving, and
fails to protect the preservation of a democratic government in which public jobs are part of the
public domain and not the property of the political party in power. 162 By allowing incentives as
great as a person’s economic livelihood, the practice of patronage forces individuals to
participate in the democratic process from the perspective of the employer, which may or may
not emulate their own personal beliefs.163
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The concept of gaining political loyalty through acts of coercion, such as political
patronage, hinders an individuals’ ability to participate in the democratic processes by forcing
them to choose to participate from the employer’s sanctioned perspective or jeopardize their
ability to be hired, promoted, or maintain gainful employment. This practice becomes even more
disconcerting when coupled with the accepted practice of discharging employees for critical
speech. Rodric Schoen contends, “Hiring for political reasons is no different than firing for
political reasons and both are forbidden by the Constitution.”164 What Scalian-Originalism has
done in the cases Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois and Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr, regarding employee speech, is examined both sides of the same coin by deciding at
what level an employee can participate in the democratic processes before the employer has the
right to abridge the employee’s First Amendment guarantees. Scalian-Originalism supports the
reification of stability at the sacrifice of democratic participation. These two cases are
intrinsically implying that an employee, at the very least, should remain silent on issues that the
employer may find displeasing, and if they choose to speak, it should be in the matter prescribed
by the employer. Scalian-Originalism is attempting to create a dictum eradicating an employee’s
First Amendment right to freedom of speech by insisting that governmental stability supersedes
an individual’s legitimate right to participate in the democratic process.
Scalian-Originalism does gain some legitimacy from a Critical Legal perspective
when ruling on matters of freedom of speech rights for elected officials. These rulings support
the theories of equality and heightened democratic participation. However, with the issue of an
employee’s right to free speech the methodology appears illegitimate by Critical Legal
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standards due to the hindrance of an employee’s ability to speak on matters of public or political
concern without coerced incentives or facing penalties for disagreeable statements. By enforcing
self-censorship while simultaneously safeguarding the perpetuation of the current elites’ agenda
and status quo, Scalian-Originalism is stifling democratic participation and creating inequality by
indicating the supremacy of the elites’ ideologies. Therefore, resulting in the Critical Legal
Studies’ claim that Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation in First Amendment cases regarding
employee’s political speech lacks legitimacy.
SCALIAN-ORIGINALISM AND ANONYMOUS POLITICAL SPEECH
The second category of speech addressed by Scalian-Originalism is anonymous political
speech. There are only two cases in this category, and like employee political speech, the
methodology has factors suggesting both the legitimacy and illegitimacy of Scalian-Originalism.
The case Doe #1 v. Reed deals with the issue of petitioner accountability, while the case
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission addresses the issue of an individual publishing political
literature anonymously. Scalia voted against anonymity in all aspects of political speech citing in
both cases that there is no historical support or precedent for anonymous political speech;
therefore, it does not receive constitutional protections. However, these cases address two very
distinct issues within a democratic society. The first issue addressed is the need for voter
accountability to ensure authenticity for official elections, petitions, and referendums. The
second matter examined is an individuals’ ability to participate in the democratic process by
disseminating their point-of-view on topics of public or political concern, which are neither
slanderous nor libelous, without revealing their identity.
The issue of voter accountability was challenged in the case Doe #1 v. Reed. The
state of Washington’s constitution allows the request for a referendum, or direct vote, by the
58

state’s citizens to challenge state law. In order for the challenge to make it onto the ballot, the
Secretary of the State of Washington must receive a petition containing enough signatures of
registered voters to equal at least four percent of the electorate that participated in the last
gubernatorial election. For the signature to be valid the petitioner must provide their address and
the county in which they are registered to vote. In 2009 the state of Washington proposed a bill
that would allow gay couples to be viewed as essentially married in the eyes of the law through
the act of domestic partnerships. An anti-gay group Protect Marriage Washington began a
petition titled “Protect Marriage, Protect Children” that would call for the bill to be put forth as a
referendum. They succeeded, and the ballot contained the bill supporting gay domesticpartnerships. By a narrow margin the bill was enacted in favor of expanding gay rights.
Following the vote several individuals requested to see the “Protect Marriage, Protect Children”
petition under the state’s Public Records Act since it was a matter of public record relating to
legislation. Protect Marriage Washington sought an injunction against releasing the names and
information of the petition’s signees arguing that in matters of referendum the Public Records
Act violates the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. The Supreme Court heard the case, and in a vote of 8-1 ruled in favor the
state claiming that the disclosure of referendum petitioners did not violate the First Amendment
and identifying petitioners was a compelling interest of the state. Justice Scalia wrote a
concurrence for this case.165
First, Scalia rebutted the lone, dissenter Justice Clarence Thomas’ claim that
America had a long history of protecting anonymous speech. Scalia argued that there is no
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historical precedent protecting anonymous speech. He also stated that voter accountability was
vital for democracy, and that, “requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts
fosters civic courage, without it democracy is doomed.”166 Critical Legal Theory supports this
notion of an accountable electorate populace in official political acts as a way to ensure equality
within democracy. It is important that the citizenry has the ability to check the authenticity of
petitions for a referendum because it is an official act of legislation, and checks and balances
must be in place to guarantee against abuses such as the falsification of signatures. By allowing
the verification of a petition’s authenticity, Scalian-Originalism is furthering societal equality
and allowing for individuals to participate in the democratic processes by playing the role of
watchdog. In matters of public legislation, such as a referendum, anonymity cannot be tolerated
because the potential for abuse is highly possible. Scalia’s insistence on public disclosure and
voter accountability in this case in order to protect the foundations of democracy are supported
as legitimate by Critical Legal Studies. This legitimacy, however, is not garnered by the idea that
anonymous speech has no place within a democracy, but rather it is legitimate because
anonymity has no place in acts of legislation in a democracy attempting to strive toward equality
and democratic participation.
Anonymous speech does have a valid place in the American democracy when it
allows an individual to further participate in democratic practices. In1988, Ohio had a law that
forbade citizens from distributing political literature anonymously; all literature had to contain
the name and address of the person or campaign official that was issuing the literature. Margaret
McIntyre handed out leaflets to people who attended a public meeting in Ohio. The leaflet
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expressed her opposition to a proposed school tax levy, but rather than signing her own name,
she signed it as "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." McIntyre was charged with violating an
Ohio Election Commission Code and found guilty. She appealed to the Court of Common Pleas,
which reversed the ruling. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the decision, thus again finding
McIntyre guilty. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.167
In a 7-2 vote the Court ruled that Ohio’s law prohibiting the distribution of
anonymous political literature abridged the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment
because it hindered an individual’s ability to advocate for political causes.168 Justice Scalia wrote
a dissent arguing that the case made for supporting anonymity has no historical support. He
argued that anonymity tarnishes the sanctity of the “democratic process” and allows for
falsehoods by eliminating accountability.169 Essentially, he disputed the argument that making a
person claim their writing or speech in no way hinders them for participating in the democratic
process. However, Amy Constantine argues that the desire to remain anonymous is often “driven
by a fear of reprisal or the desire for privacy.”170
As previously shown, Scalian-Originalism supports the societal practice of an
authoritative punishment for critical and unfavorable speech. This may, as Jennifer Wieland
explains, help understand why at certain times during the history of America, “anonymous
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expression has been a tool for those expressing controversial or unpopular views.”171 Many have
chosen to speak under the cover of anonymity to express political ideas and to shield the speaker
from the “tyranny of the majority.”172 By speaking anonymously, an individual is able to stop the
suppression of their ideas “at the hand of an intolerant society.”173 Critical Legal Studies
supports anonymous political speech, provided that it is not slanderous or libelous, because it
allows those forced into self-censoring out of fear of reprisal to have a voice and to participate in
the democracy. Scalian-Originalism’s assertion that speech without accountability injures the
democratic process is illegitimate because it does not take into account those who have no other
avenue through which they can participate within the political landscape.
By treating anonymous political speech the same as anonymous political acts, the
methodology fails to recognize the importance of protecting certain forms of speech that could
prove to be valuable to American citizens once it reaches a public audience. The acceptance that
compulsory disclosure will cause at least some ideas from being expressed is unacceptable from
the perspective of enhancing equality and democratic participation. In matters concerning
anonymous political speech Scalian-Originalism fails to meet the criteria for legitimacy from a
Critical Legal perspective, but it does gain legitimacy with its acknowledgement of the
importance of accountability for official political actions.
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SCALIAN-ORIGINALISM AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE AS POLITICAL SPEECH
The third category of political speech given due consideration by Scalian-Originalism is
campaign finance as a form of political expression. This topic is one that has received a great
deal of criticism from both the academy and the populace as many have condemned the idea
that corporations should receive the same rights as actual persons. 174 Scalia remained insistent
through all four campaign-financing cases that the First Amendment protected financial
campaign contributions.
Scalia began ruling, in what would prove to be a consistent stance, in favor of defining
campaign contributions as protected political speech, with the 1989 case Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to support a candidate for
the state’s House of Representatives by placing a newspaper ad using general funds. The
organization was not allowed to use general funds to for political expenditures because the
Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from supporting or opposing
candidates by using treasury money. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce argued that the act
violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed, and in a 6-3 decision, the majority
argued that the Michigan Campaign Finance Act was narrowly tailored and served a valuable
state interest in maintaining the integrity of the American political process. Scalia dissented. 175
Scalia reasoned that there was no compelling interest to prevent corporations from
participating in political speech and that limiting corporations’ involvement in politics denies the
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possibility for opposing views to enter the market place of ideas. Scalia lambasts the majority’s
argument that campaign finance regulations are imperative given the unfair advantage for those
with money to outspend those without wealth; thus, giving the wealthy a louder voice within the
political arena. Scalia argues that it was never the intention of those who framed the Constitution
to regulate political speech. Scalia writes in his dissent, “The fundamental approach to the First
Amendment, I had always thought, was to assume the worst, and to rule the regulations of
political speech ‘for fairness sake’ simply out of bounds.”176 Interestingly, by acknowledging
that it is not the government’s role to ensure that the political process is “fair,” Scalia is
acknowledging the inequality created by Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First
Amendment, but he is arguing that inequality is not a justifiable reason to proscribe political
speech. This sentiment of favoring individuals’ rights over regulations seeking a more equitable
political process is one that Scalian-Originalism maintains throughout all of the campaign
financing cases.177
In 2003, the Supreme Court once again addressed the issue of campaign finance as a
form of political speech in the case McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. This case
addressed the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002. After a long and arduous
process Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold passed the Act to reform the way money is
raised and spent on political campaigns. The Act had three key provisions: 1) a ban on
unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations,
unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; 2)
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limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up
to 60 days prior to an election; and 3) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for
advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures"). 178
The bill contained a unique provision that allowed for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court after
an early federal trial. A three-judge panel heard the argument that the Act violated the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech clause and struck down the Bipartisan Campaign Finance
Reform Act of 2002’s ban on soft money, but left the rest of the Act intact. The federal court’s
ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and rule on the appeal.179
The Supreme Court heard the case in September 2003, and by a narrow margin of 54 ruled in favor of all of the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002.
In the Court’s decision written by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and John Paul Stevens the
majority upheld the precedent of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and argued that
because, “money, like water, will always find an outlet,” the government had a legitimate and
compelling interest to prevent, “both the actual corruption threatened by large financial
contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the
appearance of corruption.”180 Once again Scalia did not agree that the government had a
compelling interest to further quell political speech because avoiding corruption is not a valid
argument, and he dissented.
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Scalia argued that regulations on campaign finance did not create equality within the
political process because limitations on financial contributions overwhelmingly help the
incumbent. Furthermore, he argued that spending money is unequivocally a form of political
speech and should therefore be protected regardless of whether it is a corporation or individual
who is ‘speaking.’ Justices Scalia asserted, “in the modern world giving the government the
power to exclude corporations from political debate enables it effectively to muffle the voices
that best represent the most significant segments of the economy and the most passionately held
social and political views.”181 Scalia further argued that muffling corporations’ ability to speak
damages the foundations of democracy by limiting the public’s access to opposing views.
Scalian-Originalism’s core argument that campaign finance limitations violate the First
Amendment, and that the government has no compelling interest to prevent political speech
based on an argument of equality were once again reiterated in 2006 when the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 was challenged as a violation of the First Amendment.
However, this time Scalian-Originalism would score a victory.
The nonprofit organization Wisconsin Right to Life ran commercial ads urging the
public to contact two U.S. Senators and to tell them to oppose the filibuster of judicial nominees.
The corporation intended to have the ads run through the 2004 election, but the Federal Election
Commission would not allow the ads to run within 60 days prior to the election because they
violated the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002. The Wisconsin Right to Life
sued, arguing that their ads were “issue ads” and not “express advocacy” ads in favor or
opposing a candidate; therefore, their First Amendment right to free speech was being violated.
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The Supreme Court heard the case and ruled in favor of the nonprofit organization citing that
issue ads were different from express advocacy ads and that limiting issue ads would,
“unquestionably chill a substantial amount of political speech.” 182 Justice Scalia wrote a
concurrence citing that the desire to limit the power of elites was not a valid state interest and
that financial limits on political campaigns impedes the First Amendment rights of everyone.183
By having the Court recognize the right of corporations to participate in political speech ScalianOriginalism’s interpretation of financial contributions as a form of political speech gained more
legitimacy. In addition, it opened the door for a huge victory against campaign finance
regulations in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
In the controversial 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission a severely
divided court of 5-4 ruled in favor of the free-speech clause protecting corporate funding of
independent political broadcasters and that under that protection the broadcasters cannot be
limited. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which sought to end “big money”
campaign contribution, was a federal mandate that prohibited corporations and unions from
using their general treasury to fund advertisements in support or against a candidate 30 days
before a primary or 60 days before a general election. Citizens United asked for an injunction,
citing that the act violated the First Amendment, in order to prevent the act from applying to its
film Hillary: The Movie, which expressed opinions about Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton’s bid
for presidency. Ultimately, the Court sided with Citizens United, and essentially took caps off of
the amount of money any one organization can donate because it allowed corporations to
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produce and air propaganda that outright favored a candidate or cast their opponent in a negative
light.184 This ruling essentially circumvents previous attempts at campaign finance reform
because it cut out the middle man and made it legal for corporations to act as independent
individuals and spend any amount they see fit on behalf of their candidate.
The divisive ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission appeared to
bolster Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of campaign financing as a symbolic political speech
protected by the First Amendment. Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion but also authored a
concurrence that addressed Justice Stevens’ dissent. Stevens argued that the framers would have
never supported this decision because they had a great deal of mistrust toward corporations. 185
Justice Scalia responded that Stevens was mistaken because there were no historical grounds to
exclude corporations from speaking. He retorted that the First Amendment protects “speech” and
not the “speaker.” Scalia also reiterated that it is not the role of the government to prevent “moral
decay” by abridging speech.186
Through all four cases regarding campaign finance, Scalia’s application of ScalianOriginalism’s theory affirmed that corporations ought to receive the same First Amendment
protections as individuals, that campaign finance should be protected as political speech, and that
the government has no compelling interest to further an equitable political process. However,
formalist scholars argued that the subsequent results of the rulings in McConnell and Citizens
United served to further convolute the issue of campaign finance. The McConnell case created a
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new objective for campaign finance known as the “general participatory self-government
objective,”187 which Justice Breyer notes in McConnell, is aimed to “democratize the influence
that money can bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building public confidence in
that process, broadening the base of candidate’s meaningful financial support, and encouraging
greater public participation.”188 However, this new objective fails to take into account the
anticorruption measures achieved through expenditures limitations,189 which intended to level
the amount of speech in an attempt to balance participatory practices for every citizen.190
Similarly, the second critique of Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of campaign finance is that
it rejects the argument of governmental corruption by allowing corporations to have an undue
influence over elected officials.191 Instead, Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation has opened the
door for the “quid-pro-quo corruption” argument. This argument circumvents the state’s
assertion of protecting the sanctity of the political system from not only verifiable corruption, but
also the appearance of corruption, by creating a new doctrine of the First Amendment that
protects all campaign contributions except those which qualify as a “bribe.”192The complexity of
campaign finance legislation is compounded by this quid-pro-quo doctrine due to the extreme
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difficulty in proving whether a campaign donation is intended as a bribe or if it is given in
support of the candidate with no strings attached.193 This incoherence caused by ScalianOriginalism’s position of campaign finance as a protected form of political speech is the third
and final formalist critique. Richard L. Hasen argues that the Court’s adoption of a new
campaign finance jurisprudences that eradicated decades of prior precedent has led to a new
incoherence because “it is unlikely that the court will follow the new case to its extreme— for
example to allow spending by foreign nationals to influence candidate elections, to treat
spending in judicial elections the same way as spending for other races, or to strike down
reasonable limits on campaign contributions made directly to candidates.” 194 Simply put, the
liberal argument against Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of campaign finance, as a First
Amendment protected freedom of political speech, fails to remain consistent with prior precedent
and fails to clearly define the new guidelines for campaign finance; thus, adding to the
complexity of future cases, and creating the new objective

of “general participatory self-

government” without providing support that the new First Amendment protection of political
contributions would in fact further that goal.195 Interestingly, the argument against the “general
participatory self-government objective” is closely related to the Critical Legal critique of
Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s protection of campaign finance as
political speech.
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From a Critical Legal Studies perspective the definitive Scalian-Originalism ruling in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission creates an inexcusable amount of inequality
within the political process because it hinders political participation by those who cannot afford
to participate. Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of finance contributions fails to take into
account the vast wealth inequality within American society, which creates a huge gap in
opportunities for individuals to speak and participate in the democratic process. It also fails to
acknowledge the adverse societal effects of allowing those with greater wealth, or the elites, a
larger opportunity to circulate their agenda and a greater ability to coerce the masses into
supporting that agenda.
In Edward N. Wollf’s seminal piece Top Heavy: The Increasing Inequality of Wealth in
America and What Can Be Done About It, he emphasizes the need for research to examine the
monetary inequalities within American society beyond just the income inequalities, but instead
the wealth inequalities. He argued that the study of wealth inequalities provides a better
representation of the economic inequalities within the society than income because income
fluctuates while wealth tends to simply grow.196 The author points out that following the market
deregulation of the Reagan years American society saw an unprecedented increase in wealth
inequality.197 Through a quantitative economic analysis Wolff found that, “the top 1 percent of
wealth holders controlling 39 percent of total household wealth. Focusing more narrowly on
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financial wealth the richest one percent of households owned 48 percent of the total.”198
Furthermore, while wealth continued to grow for the top, “the bottom 40 percent showed an
absolute decline. Almost all absolute gains in real wealth accrued to the top 20 percent of wealth
holders.”199 Wolff found that the level of wealth inequality within American society is much
greater than other “class-ridden” societies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan.200
Wolff concludes by arguing that there is a societal need for taxation on wealth in order to lessen
the gap between the top and bottom, which would affect only a small percent of the population
(about three percent), but would allow for more wealth distribution within the society as a
whole.201 Edward N. Wolff described the importance of wealth distribution as vital to the
equality within American society, but more specifically the political arena because, “in the
political arena large fortunes can be a source of economic power and social influence…large
accumulations of financial and business assets can confer special privileges on their holders.
Such fortunes are often transmitted to succeeding generations, thus creating family
‘dynasties.’”202 In this piece, Wolff articulates the argument against American wealth disparities.
He advocates for change because, by lessening the wealth inequalities within the American class
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system it is possible to create a more equitable society, and limit the elites’ ability to shape
society and further their own agenda through the legal arena.
Edward N. Wolff’s concerns regarding an unfair advantage given to the wealthy to
shape and control the American political agenda are valid. Even Justice Scalia concedes that
individuals and corporations spend money on campaigns and candidates because it works on
shaping the public’s opinion.203 The impact that elites have on shaping American society and
culture through the promotion of their agenda is the topic Thomas Frank explores in his book
Pity the Billionaire: The Hard-Times Swindle and the Unlikely Comeback of the Right.
Frank’s book explores a theme of “haves” versus the “have nots,” and how this societal
framework has shaped America’s political system. Frank contends that the 2010 election results
are a consequence of the systemic problem of the populace willingly following rhetoric rather
than reason. Therefore, the influence allotted to the “haves” in American society due to the
hierarchical political structure allows the power elites to enjoy the fruits of the populace’s
ignorance.204
Frank argues that the economic collapse of 2008 and 2009 caused the modern recession,
and originated when the power elites failed to be properly wrangled in by the government. Frank
contends that the largest cause of the economic crash was the deregulation of the banking
industry.205 Frank’s research focuses the phenomena in which American people rallied around
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certain Conservative ideals, such as the need for a free market206 and the bad neighbor doctrine,
even though these positions contradicted the interests of the masses.207 Frank’s book explains
how America’s wealthiest were able to shape the outcome of the 2010 election in favor of
George W. Bush who in return continued to create policies that disproportionately favored the
elites.208 The author’s research succinctly examines how the detrimental effects that the
deregulation of campaign finance reform, and the subsequently larger voice given to those on
top, contributed to economic and social inequalities that followed the 2010 election.209By giving
further spending power to the elites though rulings such as McConnell and Citizens United, from
a Critical Legal perspective, what Scalian-Originalism accomplished creates greater inequality
within American society. Wolff highlighted the enormous already existing wealth gap between
those on the top and those on the bottom, and Frank’s writing serves as a cautionary tale about
how the elites can mislead the public in such a way that would allow for the masses to rally
behind positions that oppose their own interest. In summation, due to wealth disparities ScalianOriginalism has allowed for those who can afford it, the elites, the unbridled ability to promote
their agenda, while systematically quelling the voices of those who cannot afford the same level
of influence. This can have a negative effect on equality within American society as a whole by
unfairly promoting an agenda that favors the elites, and preventing the citizenry from protecting
their own interest by failing to allow equal access to opposing arguments. The inequality created
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through Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of campaign finance as a form of protected political
speech, from a Critical Legal perspective, strains Justice Scalia’s claim of applying a legitimate
theory and methodology to the interpretation of the First Amendment.
SCALIAN-ORIGINALISM AND NON-POLITICAL SPEECH
Non-political speech is the final category of speech considered by Scalian-Originalism.
Scalia has stated that political speech deserves a greater a priori status than non-political speech.
Perhaps this is because political speech is easier is to categorize and define than non-political
speech because non-political speech is based on issues of morality, which by its nature is fluid,
and changes and evolves over time. The liberal perspective has attempted to resolve the fluid
nature of non-political cases by adopting the doctrine of prior restraint and applying time, place,
and manner restrictions.210Non-political speech deals with issues of morality or societal concern
and the government’s right to abridge speech based on time, place, and manner restrictions.The
Court has consistently held that time, place, and manner restrictions violate the prior restraint
doctrine only if the state fails to create “content neutral” legislation.211 It is intended for time,
place, and manner restrictions to allow the state the authority to allocate resources, such as the
use of a public park for assembly, in an equitable manner to avoid conflicts based on the scarcity
of space.212 However, the ability for the state to grant permits for speech based on a wide range
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discretionary tactics increases the possibility of censorship based on the content of the speech.213
The level of discretionary authority afforded to the state’s allows for legislative practices that
seek to further define morality within in American society, which from a critical perspective
makes it the Court’s duty to guarantee that time, place, and manner restrictions are not used as a
guise for censorship, and that in cases where censorship does occur the state has a compelling
interest to warrant prior restraint.
These two formalist First Amendment doctrines garner legitimacy for cases of nonpolitical speech as long as the legislation in question is considered to be content neutral or if the
state is able to provide compelling interest abridging of the First Amendment. From a Critical
Legal Theory perspective legitimacy is gained in non-political cases regarding morality when the
ruling furthers equality within the society or democratic participation, which at times may allow
for legislation that is not content-neutral to be found just. If the legislation mirrors current
societal values and morals, or the legislation seeks to protect or further the interests of
historically disenfranchised groups then from a Critical Legal perspective the legislation is
legitimate. Therefore, the court has the right and the responsibility to review cases regarding
morality from a modern perspective and rule accordingly to the legislation’s ability to further
equality and democratic participation. Scalian-Originalism’s theory rebukes this notion that the
Court has a responsibility to help shape society in an equitable manner and instead favors the
formalist argument of content-neutral legislation and the subsequent time, place, and manner
restrictions.
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There are seven non-political rulings, which Scalia weighed in on from an Originalist
perspective. All of the cases deal with moral issues and the state’s implicit or explicit attempt to
regulate morality. Scalian-Originalism’s methodology applies the formalist understanding of the
First Amendment on issues of non-political speech. First, Scalian-Originalism examines
legislation to identify if it is content neutral, or at least appears as content neutral. If Scalia finds
that the legislation is not content neutral, but rather morally defined, then, this legislation is
justifiable as long as the morals it seeks to define align with the moral perspectives of the
American culture during the time of the drafting of the Constitution.
In issues regarding time, place, and manner restrictions, Scalia sides with the state as long
as the state’s restrictions of speech appears content neutral. As previously stated, it can be a
difficult task for the Court to discern when time, place, and manner restrictions are truly content
neutral. However, in some cases the state’s blatant censorship of content is so clearly visible that
from a liberal perspective the Court has no choice other than to rule in favor of the speaker. In
two unanimous cases the Court found that the state’s morally compelling argument to restrict
speech was not a justifiably compelling interest according to the First Amendment doctrine of
prior restraint.
In the first case 44 Liquormart Inc. V. Rhode Island petitioners filed suit against the state
of Rhode Island claiming that its statute banning the advertisements of liquor prices in places
where liquor is not sold violated the retailers’ right to freedom of speech. The state argued that it
had a vested interest in protecting consumers from “commercial harms,” and promoting
temperance.214
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In the 44 Liquormart Inc. case the Court applied the Central Hudson Test as formed in
the case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.215In this case the
Court ruled that a regulation banning an electric utility company from promoting and advertising
the use of electricity violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This ruling founded the
Central Hudson Test, which is a four-step analysis to be applied to cases concerning commercial
speech. First the court must decide if the speech in question promotes lawful activity and is not
misleading. Second, the Court must decide if the state’s interest is substantial. Third, the Court
considers if the regulation serves to advance the state’s substantial interest. Finally, the Court
must conclude that the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.216
After applying these guidelines the Court ruled in favor of the liquor sellers in the 44 Liquormart
Inc. case because it found that the state’s ban was far too “paternal,” and hindered public choice.
Scalia concurred with the ruling, but disagreed with the use of the Central Hudson test in this
case. He argued that this test was not formed at the time that the First Amendment was adopted,
and that he is not convinced that the Central Hudson Test reflects the framers understanding of
the First Amendment.217
In the second case, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the state once again attempted to defend the
regulation of speech based on a moral argument, and once again the state lost its argument due to
the lack of the legislation’s content neutral nature. The state’s Bias-Motivated Criminal
Ordinance was constitutionally challenged after a crudely fashioned cross was burned on the
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lawn of a black family, allegedly by several teenagers. The teens were charged under a local
ordinance that prohibited the display of a symbol, which “arouses anger alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”218 The state attempted to ensure
that the rights of groups historically discriminated against were not violated by enacting this
criminal ordinance.219 Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the court and he argued
that the ordinance was on its face invalid and unconstitutional because it prohibited otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of subject that the speech addressed. He argued that not all
speech is protected and even acknowledged that at times the state has successfully argued for the
regulation of speech, such as defamatory or obscene speech, that could prove detrimental to the
society as a whole. Scalia wrote, “From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free
but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited
areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly out-weighed by social interest in order and morality.’”220 However,
in this case the state had no compelling interest to restrict speech because while burning a cross
is a reprehensible act any law tailored specifically for the action violates the First Amendment.221
For Scalia, and the Court, both of these cases were “easy” cases because in both instances
the state sought to restrict speech based on its morally objectionable content. However, from a
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critical perspective these cases are not one and the same. In 44 Liquormart the state sought to
protect consenting adults from themselves, while in R.A.V. the state attempted to protect
historically disenfranchised groups, and the states citizenry, from the effects of hate speech.
From a Critical Legal perspective the ruling in 44 Liquormart is legitimate and just
because it sought to create equality among all of the state’s residents regardless to whether or not
an individual lived in a “dry” county. The Court’s ruling that the state’s paternal attempt to
promote “temperance,” by restricting the circulation of non-misleading commercial speech,
creates equality by eliminating the state’s ability to effectively determine which state residents
were able to receive information and make an informed decision on their level of participation in
the act of consuming alcohol. Furthermore, the state’s desire to promote temperance could
already be obtained without having to restrict speech through the application of criminal
legislation such as the forbiddance of an individual to drive while impaired and the
criminalization of acts that disturb the public peace. In this case the Court, and Scalia, by the
implementation of Scalian-Originalism’s theoretical approach, sought to further the interest of
equality and democratic participation by allowing individuals the ability to make informed
decisions based on an access to complete information. However, the interest of equality and
democratic participation were abandoned in the hate speech case R.A.V v. St. Paul.
Hate speech receives First Amendment protections so long as it does not incite
“imminent lawless action.”222 The imminent lawless action doctrine supports the notion that only
speech that has a direct and immediate causation of harm is punishable by the law. This doctrine
attempts to solidify the Market Place of Ideas rationale for freedom of expression. This doctrine
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can be hard for even the staunchest liberal legal scholars, such as Anthony Lewis, to support
unequivocally. Lewis argued for the punishment of speech that urges “terrorist violence to an
audience some of whose members are ready to act on the urging,”223 even if the acts of violence
do not occur within an imminent time frame. Lewis stated that this argument only supports the
restriction of speech that is “genuinely dangerous,” not less egregious forms of speech such as
flag burning or racist slang.224
Interestingly, Lewis’ acknowledgement that some speech holds such a danger to society
that it warrants censorship, buttresses the Critical Legal perspective of the First Amendment. The
distinction between the formalist perspective and Critical Legal Theory is that Critical Legal
Theory acknowledges the necessity to restrict hate speech that denies citizens individual personal
security and liberty, not just speech that incites physical violence.225 For Critical Legal scholars a
legal response to speech that causes harm to those historically on the “bottom,” such as women,
children, people of color, the poor, etc. is a societal statement that these vulnerable groups are
not valued members of the American polity.226
In R.A.V. the state of Minnesota attempted to create legislation that further supported the
ideal of equality and protected historically intimidated groups from being the unwilling targets of
hate speech. The state acknowledged, just as a Critical Legal Studies acknowledges, that hate
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speech, which exerts any axiom that continues the subordination of individuals at the bottom of
society, lacks societal value and simply continues the legacy of inequality. In R.A.V. Scalia
dismissed the state’s attempt to criminalize the racist action of burning the cross because the
legislation was not content neutral, and by nullifying the state’s pursuit to redress systematic
discrimination, Scalia maintained the status quo of inequality.
Racism has been imbued within American culture since the first settlers made their way
across the ocean. From the genocide of Native Americans, to the lynching and ascendancy of
whites over blacks, America has an ugly history of maltreating persons of color. The undeniable
subjugation of blacks within American society requires that the law consider the victim’s story
prior to creating a just and fair hate speech jurisprudence.227 By examining hate speech from the
bottom, or victim’s perspective, the judiciary is forced to acknowledge the societal harm and
inequality that continues to be perpetuated by the First Amendment’s protection of hate
speech.228
In the article Hate Speech and Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, Clay
Calvert proposes that the courts and legislative bodies examine hate speech through the lens of
two Communications models: transmission model and ritual model. The author argues that
applying these models will help the courts and legislative bodies scrutinize the effects hate
speech has on the individual and American society.229 Applying the transmission model to hate
speech directs the courts’ attention to the “immediate, and overt behavioral changes, physical
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responses, and mental anguish suffered by the targets of hate speech.”230 The ritual model,
Calvert argues, illuminates the long-term cumulative harm that occurs through the repeated use
of racist speech towards minorities, which serves to perpetuate and reinforce discriminatory
attitudes and behaviors.231 Calvert concludes that the continued protection of hate speech
promotes feelings of inferiority, facilitates the unequal treatment of groups, and creates and
maintains a hegemonic power structure.232 In this article the author does not attempt to address
the legality of the First Amendment’s protection of hate speech, but rather simply, “offers courts
and legislative bodies a vehicle for better understanding how racist and sexist speech creates and
maintains a reality of discrimination.”233
Critical Legal Studies recognizes, as Calvert does, the continuous inequalities that are
formed and sustained through the acceptance of hate speech. This is why it is imperative that the
legal system adopts a doctrinal basis of reparations. Mari J. Matsuda argues that historically
victimized groups will continue to be denied personal liberty and democratic equality until the
legal system acknowledges the need for reparations as an act of contrition.234 The author
suggests a form of monetary reparations as a symbolic gesture affirming the legitimacy of the
victims’ claims of systematic inequality, and a form of reparations in which the legal system
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aims to protect the interests of minorities.235 By acknowledging the sustained inequality of
minority groups within American society, it becomes the duty of the courts to “promote good
rather than evil.”236 The courts have the transformative power to correct past injustices, to
equally redistribute power out of the hand of the dominant class who continue to benefit from
historical inequalities, and construct a more equitable society for all.237
Formalist scholars may find the restriction of hate speech, as argued by Critical Legal
scholars, as an erosion to the First Amendment’s freedom of speech protection.238 However, even
the formalist perspective has acknowledged that there are forms of speech that do not warrant
protection, such as fighting words, forms of obscenity, slanderous, and libel statements. Legal
liberals have conceded that there are some forms of speech that are harmful to the democratic
process and lack societal value. The acknowledgement that the First Amendment is not an
absolute, and that the state does have a compelling interest to restrict certain forms of speech,
begets the Critical Legal argument for the restriction of hate speech. Given the level of harm
created and sustained by hate speech and the minimal value it has in the market place of ideas,
the argument for a new First Amendment doctrine that embraces a goal of equality and
furthering democratic participation via the censorship of hate speech does not seem so radical.
Applying Scalian-Originalism, Scalia reviewed the two time, place, and manner cases
R.A.V. v. St. Paul and 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island as similar cases in which the state
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attempted to restrict speech based on moral ground, and thus violated the prior restraint doctrine.
Without taking into account that the state in R.A.V. sought to remedy historical atrocities and
create a more equitable society, while in 44 Liquormart the state attempted to create inequality,
Scalia upheld the formalist perspective of First Amendment jurisprudence, and continued the
legacy of promoting the status quo of inequality for those on the bottom. Critical Legal Studies
endorses the legitimacy of Scalia’s ruling in 44 Liquormart based on its attempt to further
equality, but finds his ruling in R.A.V. illegitimate because it failed to recognize the facilitation
of inequality brought about through the protection of hate speech.
Scalia took the two complex time, place, and manner cases R.A.V. v. St. Paul and 44
Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island and simplified them into prior restraint cases. By ruling that
these cases both dealt with the restriction of speech based on its content Scalia did not even have
to address whether or not the state had a compelling interest to garner time, place, and manner
restrictions. However, it is not always so easy for the Court to determine if the state is justly
applying time, place, and manner restrictions or if the state is restricting speech based on its
content. In the cases Thomas v. Chicago Park District and Hill v. Colorado, Scalia sides with the
state when he deems the legislation regarding the use of a public park to be content neutral and
sides with the petitioner when the state enacts a semantically neutral law that Scalia believes
targets unfavorable speech.
In Thomas v. Chicago Park District the Park District adopted an ordinance that required
individuals to obtain a permit before allowing them to conduct large-scale events in the public
park. The ordinance allowed for the denial of a permit based on thirteen specified grounds. It
also stated that the Park District must process all applications within 28 days and when they did
not approve a petitioner’s request, they must explain the reasons for denial. The denied
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applicants had the ability to appeal first with the park's general superintendent and then to a state
court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board made several attempts to obtain permits to
hold rallies in the park that would advocate for the legalization of marijuana. After only
receiving a permit for some of their request, the Windy City Hemp Development Board filed suit
alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it allowed the Chicago Park District to
censor speech based on unfavorable content. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Scalia,
the Court found that First Amendment’s freedom of speech does not guarantee that a permit must
be issued every time a request is made. Furthermore, they found that the Chicago Park District
ordinance was content-neutral and therefore protected by the First Amendment’s time, place, and
manner doctrine.239
The facts of the case, particularly that the permits had been previously issued, support
Scalia’s argument that the state was acting within its authority to regulate the use of public space
among the polity in accordance with the time, place, and manner doctrine. Critical Legal Studies
would argue that the state has a vested interest in regulating public arenas in such a manner as to
allow multiple voices and messages to be heard. Justice Scalia’s ruling in Thomas satisfied the
liberal, “public forum” doctrine, which argues, and is agreed upon to a degree by Critical Legal
Studies, that open public spaces and accessible properties owned by the government, such as
parks, streets, sidewalks, etc., are an effective arena for communication for all citizens regardless
of “their political ideology, private wealth, property ownerships, social status, or popularity.”240
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Due to the neutral-viewpoint wording and application of the state’s ordinance in Thomas, the
case was not examined with the most rigorous form of scrutiny, which meant the state only had
to prove a significant interest and not a compelling one. Though liberal and Critical Legal
scholars differ on what the Court should consider to be a “compelling interest,” both sides agree
in the need for the citizenry to have equal access to public forums in order to disseminate their
views. The Court has not always been delivered a time, place, and manner case as “easy,” as
Thomas v. Chicago Park District. This case is unique because the state was able to prove the
neutrality of the legislation beyond the facially neutral language of the statue. By providing
evidence proving that the state did grant some of the Windy City Hemp Development Board
permit requests, the state was able to definitively prove that it did not cast a wide blanket of
restriction on a particular group’s message, nor prevent the group’s ideas from being shared in a
public forum; but rather, the state plainly limited the group’s access to the public forum in
accordance to the guidelines laid forth in the ordinance. Ultimately, a Critical Legal perspective
finds this ruling to be legitimate from both a formalist and Critical Legal perspective because of
its equitable interest in regulating public arena access in such a manner as to let a wide variety of
speech from several viewpoints to enter the market place of ideas. The state’s interest in
regulating speech in an equitable manner allows for a wide variety of groups to obtain access to a
public forum, which furthers the groups’ ability to participate in the democratic process. Scalia’s
ruling in this case is legitimate because it protects the state’s interest to promote equality and
democratic participation. However, by justifying Thomas v. Chicago Park District’s ruling by
applying the content neutral doctrine to the state’s ordinance some liberal legal scholars argued
that this left the question of whether the state’s actions were truly neutral or was this an act of
discriminatory regulation to restrict speech based on the state’s perception of the low societal
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value of the message.241 By stumbling upon Critical Legal Studies legal goal of equality through
the use of the content neutral doctrine, rather than adopting a new doctrine that takes into
account the Critical Legal understanding of the complexity of free speech cases, which cause the
necessity of the Court to review the state’s interest in each case from the perspective of
furthering equality and democratic participation, Scalian-Originalism left the door open for the
possibility of states to enact legislation that appears neutral in nature, but is in fact discriminatory
towards unfavorable speech. The prospect of states restricting speech, while remaining within the
boundaries of the content neutral doctrine emerges in the case Hill v. Colorado.
In 1993, the Colorado legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful for any person
within one hundred feet of the entrance of a healthcare facility to approach within eight feet of
another person without prior consent from the person being approached. The law made it illegal
for a person to approach another individual with the intention of passing a leaflet or handbill, to
display a sign, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling. The state contended that the
statute was in response to protest outside of health care facilities in which citizens seeking
medical assistance, and employees of the facilities, were allegedly verbally and physically
harassed. The state argued that it had an interest in preventing intrusive protesting because it
harmed certain individuals, and it prevented and discouraged some patients from obtaining
health care in a timely manner. Furthermore, the statute was content and viewpoint neutral and
only sought to regulate speech on the grounds of the place and manner in which the speech was
occurring. Leila Hill, along with other side-walk counselors, who previously offered information
about alternatives to abortion to women entering abortion clinics, claimed that this statute
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violated their First Amendment right to free speech and press. The lower courts ruled in favor of
the state and held that the statute imposed content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions,
that it was narrowly tailored, and that it served a significant government interest. Seven years
after the statute was enacted, in 2000, the case made it before the Supreme Court. Once again the
majority opinion, delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, concluded that the statue was
constitutionally justifiable because it did not regulate speech, “rather, it is a regulation of the
places where some speech may occur."242 Furthermore, the majority argued that whether or not
the statute was solely a regulation of the places where some speech may occur, the legislation
was content-neutral, which means the state only had to prove a significant interest, and it did so
by arguing that the statute protected the unwilling listeners interest of avoiding unwanted
communications that have been repeatedly identified as harassing.243
Justice Scalia did not join the majority in this opinion. In his dissent, Justice Scalia
argued that the statute was not content neutral because it was clearly targeting those who wished
to council others in the alternatives to abortion. Scalia further argued that this ruling eroded the
First Amendment. Previous First Amendment jurisprudence, which held that the government did
not have an interest in protecting people from unwelcomed communication, warranted the Court
to find Colorado’s statute unconstitutional. Justice Scalia concluded that this ruling, which aimed
to prevent speech that the state deemed offensive, directly opposed the First Amendment
doctrine of a marketplace of ideas, which promotes the “uninhibited, robust and wide open
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debate.”244 By ruling in favor of the state, the Court had replaced the democratic sovereignty
rationale with the new and unheard of “right to be left alone” doctrine.245
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing rebuke of the majority’s decision stating that the ruling in
Hill was just another example of the liberal justices’ attempt to pursue the fabricated
constitutional protection of abortion rights. “There is apparently no end to the distortion of our
First Amendment law that the Court is willing to endure in order to sustain this restriction upon
the free speech of abortion opponents.”246 Scalia’s argument that the state’s legislation in the
case Hill v. Colorado is not content neutral carries some validity. James B. Raskin and Clark L.
LeBlanc concur with Scalia’s assessment that the statute undeniably targets anti-abortion
protesters.247 They argue that the public forum doctrine is meant to protect groups of individuals
from the unjust regulation of speech that the state deems offensive because “democracy depends
on free speech, and free speech depends on the wide-open availability of the traditional public
forum to the citizens for speech purposes.”248 By failing to look beyond the state’s statute’s
appearance of content neutrality, as Scalia did, the majority opinion in this case created a
dangerous precedent and provided a “blueprint” for state’s intending to ban unfavorable speech
by forbidding all speech in the places where the unfavorable speech is likely to occur.249
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To the disdain of Justice Scalia, the Court ruled in favor of the state partially because it
found the legislation content neutral, which allowed for the case to be reviewed under a lesser
scrutiny, and partially because the state was able to successfully argue that the statute applied
only to areas around health-care facilities. The unique personal nature of health-care facilities,
the state argued, constitutes the state’s interest to restrict speech in favor of protecting an
unwilling listener from unfavorable speech.250 By acknowledging the listeners “right to be left
alone,” which the theoretical framework of Scalian-Originalism rebukes, the majority defends,
perhaps unintentionally, the Critical Legal discourse that the Court has a duty to protect the
special interest of historically maltreated groups in the interest of facilitating equality.
Borrowing from feminist theories, Critical Legal Studies adopts the “truth” that the
American legal system, like other societal institutions, is built on a hierarchal foundation formed
by the patriarchy that unjustly favor “male concepts,” in a pursuit to continue the subjugation of
women to men’s will.251 Understanding the struggles of the women’s right movement to
challenge inequalities in a historically male-dominated society allows Critical Legal Studies to
examine the illegitimate hierarchies created and sustained by the law and legal institutions.252
The Critical Legal perspective acknowledges the limitations of theoretical constructs and laws
created by men,253 and how those constructs hinder women’s pursuit of equality within American
society.
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While feminist-critical theorists agree that law disproportionately favors men’s agendas
and continues to concentrate power in the hands of men, two schools of theory have emerged
with distinctly different applicable models to achieve substantive equality.254First, is the “equal
treatment” model, which espouses that women should be treated equally to men in areas of the
law to rectify past recognitions of “differences” that have become legitimized unjust
repercussions.255 The second model is “substantive-equality,” which urges the acceptance and
recognition of differences in order to render the differences as inconsequential. 256 Critical Legal
Theory tends to favor the latter model because it addresses the power and authority traditionally
held by men to construct the law and its legal institutions in such a manner as to permit the
dominance of men over women, while also acknowledging the value of “female” qualities as
equal to the value of “male” qualities.257
From a Critical Legal perspective, the ruling in Hill v. Colorado is legitimate
because it protects equally both men and women seeking medical care from unwelcomed speech,
and simultaneously protects the hard fought for woman’s right to reproductive choices.
Conversely, Scalia’s ruling in this case is illegitimate because it does not acknowledge the
tremendous struggle women faced to get the Court to recognize the insurmountable sexist
disadvantages that the law created and sustained when it continually upheld the doctrinal stance
that “pregnant persons,” could not seek relief from discriminatory practices under the
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Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause because such relief would unjustly favor women since
only they can biologically be pregnant.258 By supporting the First Amendment right of antiabortion protesters to engage and harass women entering abortion clinics, Scalia continues the
inadvertent subjugation of women to men by reinforcing anachronistic laws that did not allow
women autonomous authority over their own bodies, instead women were forced into complying
with laws created by a patriarchal legal system.
When comparing the legitimacy of Scalia’s rulings in Thomas v. Chicago Park
District and Hill v. Colorado from a Critical Legal perspective an apparent dichotomy emerges.
While both statutes were written in a content neutral manner, Scalia did not examine the context
of the Thomas case beyond the prior restraint rationale, and in the Hill case relied exclusively on
the case’s context to negate the use of the prior restraint doctrine. From a Critical Legal
perspective this dichotomy is both promising and troubling. It is promising because it shows
Scalian-Originalism’s recognition that freedom of speech cases do not occur in a neutral legal
vacuum, but rather occur within a certain societal context. However, it is troubling because
Scalian-Originalism does not recognize the importance of societal context in shaping the Court’s
decision in every case. Critical Legal Studies accepts the indeterminacy of law, and that its
irregular nature makes it difficult to produce concrete, one-size-fits-all doctrines, which is why it
is imperative that judges review the context of every freedom of speech case and determine the
outcome best suited to further equality and democratic participation, even if that means the
censorship of certain forms of speech based on their predictable societal harm.
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Moral speech is the final freedom of speech category in which Scalia applied the
theory and methodology of Scalian-Originalism. In these three cases, the state sought to regulate
speech based primarily on the immoral nature of the speech, and argued that the state had a
compelling interest to abridge speech when it is so erroneous and immoral that it is likely to
cause egregious societal harm.
Scalian-Originalism asserts that in certain cases the government does have a
compelling interest to uphold morality and should be allowed to do so.259 As previously stated,
Critical Legal Theory does not dispute the law’s authority to construct and bolster moral
objectives, provided that the law is establishing a moral objective that furthers the goals of
equality and democratic participation, or reinforces the moral will of the public based on their
ability to define morality from a fully equitable and democratic participatory foundation. When
these two prescribed objectives are applied to morally defined laws a sort of symbiotic effect
occurs. When the law mirrors society’s values the citizenry develops a desire to behave in
socially acceptable and ethical way, and moves away from a society in which moral compliance
is formed by the fear of punishment towards a society that is self-regulatory. The aspiration to
behave morally from a self-regulating manner builds a greater level of legitimacy for the law
through consent and cooperation, which increases legal order and bestows upon the legal system
the effectiveness to create sustainable legislation that achieves greater polity equality.260 From
this understanding that law is being shaped by and shapes societal values, it is the contention of
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Critical Legal Studies that the Court has the duty to rule on moral issues in accordance with
either society’s moral objectives or an equitable moral objective. This Critical Legal perspective
will be used to analyze the legitimacy of Scalia’s rulings in the moral speech cases Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, and Barnes v.
Glenn Theatre Inc.
The facts in the case Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association were already
provided in detail in the introduction of this thesis, and will not be repeated at great lengths
again. Rather, the facts only pertinent to the analysis will be restated. The state of California
attempted to enact a law that would impose restrictions and labeling regulations for violent video
games that may be sold or rented to minors without parental supervision. Those who violated the
law would be penalized with fines. The state argued that it had a compelling moral interest to
protect minors from the possible harmful side effects of exposure to violent materials. The video
game industry filed a lawsuit against the statute claiming that it violated their First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the video game
industry and found the law to be unconstitutional.261
In the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court ruled that the statute was
not narrowly tailored and that the state’s argument was flawed. Scalia argued that video games
deserve the same First Amendment protections afford to entertainment mediums of the past.
“Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate
ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters,
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's
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interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”262 Also,
Scalia rationalized that the state’s argument, that children should be protected from violent
images and messages, was not compelling because it failed to recognize American society’s
“long standing tradition” of accepting minors consumption of violent entertainment, and that the
state failed to provide compelling evidence to support their claim that there is a link between
violent video games and their possible effects on children.263
Admittedly, there are fewer empirical studies on the effects of video game violence
than on the effects of TV and film violence, but this is due to the fact that video game technology
is relatively new.264 Within this field’s limited research, there is a lot of debate regarding the
level of influence violent video games have on minors. Some researchers, such as Craig A.
Anderson, have found that the effects of video game violence on minors is significantly harmful
and can result in “higher levels of aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect,
and physiological arousal, and lower levels of prosocial behavior” in minors exposed to violent
video games.265 Other researchers have found that there is little-to-no empirical evidence that
violent video games have an effect on aggression.266 Though researchers may come to
conflicting conclusions they agree that there is a need for “more comprehensive meta-analysis on
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media violence effects.”267 For Scalia the lack of definitive proof that violent video games have a
negative effect on minor’s behavior was enough to dismiss the entire body of research, and the
state’s argument that it had a morally compelling interest to curb minor’s access to violent
materials.268
Scalia quickly dismissed the state’s moral argument stating that "filling the
remaining modest gap in concerned-parents' control can hardly be a compelling state interest.”
269

However, Scalia fails to articulate why even the possibility of negative effects, caused by

violent video games on minors is not a compelling interest, but that the continuation of American
society accepting the “long standing tradition” of minors’ consuming violent entertainment
without any shred of empirical evidence, one way or the other, of its effects on society, is
morally superior to the state’s argument. Certainly, most would agree that if there was even a
remote possibility in preventing horrifically violent acts, such as the Columbine school shooting
from being committed by minors, or against minors, the state would be morally just in restricting
speech.270 Furthermore, the state attempted to regulate speech in the least restrictive way possible
by allowing minors to obtain violent video games as long as a parent was present; thus,
individuals who disagreed with the state’s moral objection to minor’s access to violent video
games were not prevented from allowing their children access to the material. From a Critical
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Legal perspective Scalian-Originalism’s dismissal of the state’s argument, which mirrored
modern social values regarding violence and minors, while supporting his ruling by
superimposing eighteenth-century societal values to modern phenomena illegitimatizes the
decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association because the Court declined to adhere
to the moral objective shaped by the public. Scalian-Originalism’s use of archaic societal values
to shape modern law also applies to Scalia’s ruling in Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.
Until issues of morality are raised, Scalian-Originalism is a staunch advocate of the
prior restraint doctrine and requires that state’s legislation must unequivocally be content neutral
in nature in order to receive First Amendment protections. In every other non-political speech
case Justice Scalia ruled against the state’s morally founded argument if the state’s statute
restricted or appeared to restrict speech based on its unfavorable content. While it may have
appeared the state could not produce a compelling interest strong enough to persuade Justice
Scalia to rule in favor of restricting speech, Scalia’s concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.
proves that it is possible for Scalian-Originalism to find justification in the restriction of speech
that lacks great societal value.
In 1991, the Supreme Court ruled in a landmark decision that allowed for states to
ban speech, in the form of expressive conduct, if it furthered the government’s substantial
interest to protect morality and social order. The case was brought before the Court by two adult
entertainment establishments, the Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge, who argued that
Indiana’s statute preventing “indecent behavior” violated the First Amendment’s freedom of
expression guarantee. Indiana’s statute regulating public nudity did not allow full nudity and
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required that dancers wear “pasties” and a “G-string.”271
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion and argued that the government was
allowed to uphold “morality,” within the public. He also argued that the law did not prevent
expression, but “conduct,” which means this form of speech does not have First Amendment
guarantees. Finally, Scalia argued that nudity had always been considered indecent or obscene,
and Indiana’s law prohibiting public nudity was just part of the country’s “long tradition,” which
had never run afoul of the First Amendment.272
Scalia’s ruling does not offer an explanation as to why the state has a morally
compelling interest to ban nudity, other than the fact that it has a long history of being immoral.
Justice Scalia does not explain what social harm the state is attempting to negate through the
regulation on public nudity other than it is indecent and obscene.

From a Critical Legal

perspective, this ruling is overly paternal in nature because it prevents consenting adults from
participating in certain forms of “conduct,” because that conduct is historically believed to be
immoral. Arguably, western cultures’ contemporary dominating consciousness that nudity is
obscene and immoral is based on the Judeo-Christian belief that after Adam and Eve’s fall from
Eden their sin opened their eyes to the shame of being naked.273 Judeo-Christian teachings
suggests that this shame was caused by Adam and Eve’s sensuality and sexual desires that were
brought about by nakedness, and as Rob Cover argues that “the subjugation of reason to sexual
passion is the cause, permitting the blame be placed not only on woman but on both naked and
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sexual creatures.”274
Nicola Beisel argues that the shamefulness of nudity and the subsequent cultural
acceptance of its obscene and indecent nature allows for cultural and political power elites within
communities to use controversies about obscenity “to bolster their social or political positions,
implying that struggles over obscenity in art are covert struggles over class and status.” 275 The
hierarchical structure of society reinforces the superiority of those in power over the powerless
and advances widely shared beliefs that the upper class is refined, while the lower class is
comprised of “unrefined hordes.”276 Through the reinforcement of hierarchical cultural schemas,
which defined the relationship between classes, ethnic groups, and genders, the upper class was
often entrusted with the task of differentiating between art and obscenity during the early
nineteenth century.277 During this period the objective of obscenity laws was to protect public
morality, especially those in the community whose class prevented them from forming the ability
to resist the lewd effects of prohibited pictures, photographs, and publications.278 The perceived
argument was that the government had a compelling interest to protect uncultured and
inexperienced people from possibly negative effects of obscene art. 279 During the early
nineteenth century, a common defense of obscenity laws, and the consequential censorship of
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female nudity in art, was based on gender and the family.280 Some argued that young men may
not be able to control their sexual feelings, and their uncontrolled arousal could threaten
“respectable” women.281 This argument is interesting from a Critical Legal perspective because it
shows that obscenity laws were created from an elitist agenda, which continued the subjugation
of women in the society by the censorship of primarily only the naked female body, and the
subjugation of women to man’s will by censoring nudity because the unrefined members of the
society would not be able to control their sexual desires produced by viewing nudity.
By understanding the conception of obscenity laws as an endeavor by society’s elites
to protect both men and women from the harmful and immoral effects of the nude female body
postmodern-feminism developed the theory that the female identity is constructed as the
“objectified other.”282 Jeanie Forte argues that “woman constitutes the position of object, a
position of other in relation to a socially-dominated male subject.”283 The culturally constructed
category of “woman” is defined as it relates exclusively to “man,” which results in the
objectification of women and their subjugated societal representation. 284 Women are absent from
the dominant culture and representation is only rendered to women through their personification
of male desire.285 Simply put, postmodern feminism argues that the patriarchal society model
creates an oppressive role for women in which they are expected to service men’s needs and
280
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submit to male dominance. Women are constructed through their sexuality as it relates to men,
and women must work to reclaim the female body from the “phallocentric” system of
representation.286
Women began using performance art during the women’s rights movement of the
1960s and 1970s as a strategic means of expression to deconstruct the patriarchal culture of
representation.287 Women also began to use performance art in overtly political ways. They used
it to address their role as the “objectified other,” and to encourage the female exploration of self.
Performance artists began performing nude to highlight the necessity of women to define their
own bodies and sexuality in the absence of male desire.288 Women recognized the conventional
uses and abuses of the female body and began “writing the body,” which identified the language
of women’s sexuality and recognized the strength in “writing” to create a new arena of
possibilities relating to women’s subjectivity.289 By performing nude, female performance artists
sought to peel away the cultural constructions created by men that made the nude female figure
taboo and immoral. They attempted to address the cultural suppression of female sexuality and
develop a means of expression for women that was not conceived through the patriarchal system
of representation.
Scalia’s argument that the state has a compelling interest to uphold morality by
banning nudity in Barnes v. Glen Theatre is illegitimate, from a Critical Legal perspective,
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because it failed to recognize how the continued perpetuation of the patriarchal construct that
nudity, is obscene and indecent, further excludes historically powerless groups, particularly
women, from receiving equitable societal status. By supporting the state’s position that nudity is
immoral and harmful to the society, even with the absence of evidence, Scalian-Originalism
continued the unjust tradition of subjugating women by supporting the objectified perception that
women cannot define their sexuality without relating it to man’s desires. Furthermore, this ruling
is illegitimate because it overwhelmingly supports the elitist paternal perspective that the upper
class must protect the lower class from their uncultured lewd natures, and that women’s virtue
would be compromised without their regulatory oversight. Scalian-Originalism’s willingness to
restrict speech of marginalized members of the community that the state finds unfavorable, but
labels obscene or indecent is also present in the case National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.
The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act gives the discretionary
authority to the National Endowment of the Arts to award financial grants to the arts. The
original guidelines for determining monetary awards stated that awards would be given to works
with “artistic and cultural significance” with the emphasis on “creativity and cultural diversity,
professional excellence, and encouragement of public education and appreciation of the
arts.”290In 1990, Congress amended this criteria and required that the National Endowment of the
Arts also consider “artistic excellence, artistic merit, and taking into consideration general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”291
Artist Karen Finley was rejected for funding along with three other performance artists and

290National

291

Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)

Id.

103

challenged the amendment as unconstitutional because it was discriminatory toward unfavorable
speech. The lower courts ruled in favor of Finley and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Scalia joined the majority of the Court, which found that the amendment did not regulate
speech and that Congress had the authority to set spending priorities, which may indirectly affect
certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity of public interest to the exclusion of
another did not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in which
he argued that the government does not have to award money according to the First Amendment.
Furthermore, refusing public funding does not prevent or abridge speech, and the law did not
violate the First Amendment because it meant what it said and it was not vague because “those
who wished to create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as they were before
the attachment of the statute.”292
The political nature of all forms of art293 and art’s ability to further democratic
participation in the political and cultural discourses294 were not addressed in Scalia’s ruling in
Finley. Justice Scalia’s ruling does not appear to recognize any societal value of the arts or the
government’s interest in the patronage of the arts as a way to protect some citizens’ ability to
articulate a political identity.295

Scalia found that the defunding of artists’ work does not

constitute the censorship of speech because the statute is clearly written and “means what it
says.” This argument does not account for the likely result of viewpoint discrimination by the
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government,296 or the possibility of artist who are seeking funding to alter a substantial portion of
their work to reflect messages they believe the National Endowment of the Arts board supports
since the artist’s entire body of work is reviewed prior to the board awarding grant money.297
Scalia’s failure to see the context of the statute, which clearly presents the government’s attempt
to restrict the content of speech,298 beyond the language of the statute prevents Justice Scalia
from considering the statute’s ability to hinder equality and political participation; therefore,
according to Critical Legal Studies this ruling is illegitimate.
In the three non-political moral speech cases Brown v. Entertainment Merchant
Association, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, and Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.,
Scalia’s rulings are illegitimate from a Critical Legal perspective. Justice Scalia’s application and
enforcement of eighteenth-century morals regarding obscenity and violence prevented him from
furthering modern social values, which include the only legitimate objectives that constitute a
morally justifiable compelling interest for the government. In all three cases, Scalian-Originalism
failed to further equitable ideals and hindered the citizenry’s ability to participate in the
democratic process.
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Chapter V: Conclusion

Out of the seventeen cases in which Justice Scalia applied an Originalist argument to
support his ruling, this analysis found five cases contained legitimate rulings from a Critical
Legal perspective: Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, Nevada
Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, Doe # 1 v. Reed, and Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White. The remaining twelve cases examined found Scalian-Originalism’s rulings illegitimate.
However, in every case, Scalia ruled in favor of the status quo by relying on phrases like it is a
“long standing tradition,” “venerable and accepted tradition,” “no historical basis,” etc., to
support his rulings in favor of the status quo. It may appear contradictory that Scalia can rule in
favor of maintaining the status quo and still be found legitimate by Critical Legal standards. This
can occur because of the indeterminacy of law. The particular facts of a case may support the
status quo position but still further equality and democratic participation. This is why it is
imperative that the Court examine the context of every case, which would contradict the
formalist legal argument regarding the rule of law. By recognizing that the nature of law prevents
judicial neutrality, it is possible to examine a judge’s rulings as they apply to modern societal
values, and hold the judge accountable for the consequences of their rulings. Essentially, this
prevents judges from hiding behind the “the law made me do it” defense in cases that produce or
uphold inequality within American society.
After analyzing Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment from a
Critical Legal perspective, consistency in Scalia’s rulings begins to emerge. In every case Scalia
ruled in favor of the party whose objective best aligned with the elitist status quo and either
maintained or strengthen the elite’s power. In Scalian-Originalism’s theoretical interpretation of
106

the First Amendment freedom of speech, the hierarchal status quo routinely receives First
Amendment protections.
In cases where one party had a vested economic interest he ruled in their favor. 299 In
matters of political speech by public employees, Scalian-Originalism supported the elite’s right
to speech according to the market place of ideas rationale,300 but supported stringent punishments
against the layperson seeking the same right. 301 In fact, the only time Scalian-Originalism
accepted the restriction of political speech for an elite member of the government was when
supporting that speech would blatantly, or with a high possibility, challenge the legitimacy of
government.302 For the layperson, Justice Scalia systematically supported the state’s right to
punish unfavorable speech303 while championing the state’s right to reward favorable
speech.304Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment continued the societal
subjugation of historically disenfranchised groups305 by delegitimizing moral claims made by the
state as not compelling enough to warrant restrictions and regulations of speech. Moral claims
made by the state were only protected if they were supported by eighteenth century societal
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values;306 otherwise, they were not even considered.307 Interestingly, Scalian-Originalism
rebuked the argument that the state had a morally compelling interest to protect historically
oppressed groups from the harms of harassing and unwanted speech, 308 but agreed that the state
had a compelling interest to protect its citizenry from willfully participating in immorally
expressive conduct.309 Justice Scalia continually ruled in favor of the state when the writing in
the challenged statute was in a content neutral manner. He did so without considering the
opposing argument that the state’s legislation was actually intended to mask content
discrimination.310 Nevertheless, Scalia recognized the importance of evaluating a statute’s
context when the subject matter in question mirrored the societal values of the founding
generation and it appeared possible that discrimination occurred based on content.311 ScalianOriginalism’s often contradictory rulings according to a formalist perspective appear quite
predictable when examined through a Critical Legal lens. Scalian-Originalism will rule in a
manner that best maintains the power in the hands of the elite; regardless of the state’s
compelling interest, prior precedent, or the rule of law. These findings are especially useful after
the passing of Justice Scalia, who firmly placed Scalian-Originalism in the arena of American
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jurisprudence, and the future of Originalism under the helm of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch.
In Justice Antonin Scalia’s The New York Times obituary Adam Liptak wrote about the
influence Scalian-Originalism had on the Court and the role that it may play in future cases.
Liptak wrote about the “effectiveness” of Scalian-Originalism in shaping the Court’s opinion on
cases involving many subjects including the application of the Second Amendment as an
individual right and the subsequent changes to criminal law due to Scalia’s interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment.312 In The Washington Post Robert Barnes wrote about Scalia’s political
leanings in his rulings and how he, “quickly became the kind of champion to the conservative
legal world that his benefactor (President Ronald Regan) was in the political realm.” 313 Others
were less favorable when reflecting on Justice Scalia’s time on the Court. In The New Yorker,
Jeffery Tobin wrote, “Atonin Scalia, who died this month, after nearly three decades on the
Supreme Court, devoted his professional life to making the United States a less fair, less tolerant,
and less admirable democracy.”314 Though authors of Scalia’s obituaries varied in tone and the
manner in which they addressed his Originalist approach all were in concurrence that he left
behind a profound impact on the Court and the future of Constitutional interpretation.
The legacy of Scalia’s constitutional interpretation and its alignment with modern
conservative political agendas explains why Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
announced within hours of Scalia’s death that the Senate would refuse to vote on any nominee

312Liptak,

Adam. (2016, February 13). Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79. The New York Times. Retrieved
February 25, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0.
313Barnes,

Robert. (2016, February 13). Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia dies at 79. The Washington Post. Retrieved
February
25,
2017,
from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at79/2016/02/13/effe8184-a62f-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html?utm_term=.f9a256e85568.
314Toobin,

Jeffery .(2016, February 29). Looking Back. The New Yorker.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/29/antonin-scalia-looking-backward.

109

presented by President Barack Obama. Instead they would wait for the results of the 2016
presidential election. On November 9, 2016, well-known businessman and reality television host
Donald J. Trump won the presidency for the Republican Party. Within his first month as the
President of the United States Trump nominated Judge Neil M. Gorsuch to replace Scalia in the
Supreme Court. In April 2017 Gorsuch was confirmed and sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice.
Gorsuch admitted his admiration of Justice Scalia and even claimed to have cried
when he heard the news of Scalia’s passing. Judge Gorsuch, like his predecessor, is a
“demonstrated Originalist” whose method of constitutional interpretation mirrors the political
principles of conservative political ideologies.

315

In a 2016 case regarding a petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment excessive-force claim, after the petitioner was shot eight times by the police,
Gorsuch ruled in favor of the state finding that petitioner was never found to be innocent, but
was released from persecution based on his right to receive a speedy trial, which the petitioner
was not granted. He cited that it is a judge’s duty to interpret the Constitution as it was written,
“And that document isn’t some inkblot on which litigants may project their hopes and dreams for
a new and perfected tort law, but a carefully drafted text judges are charged with applying
according to its original public meaning.”316 In the case United States v. Nichols regarding the
federal statute known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Gorsuch wrote a
dissent objecting to the statute’s application to those found guilty of sex crimes prior to the
enactment of the act. He used an Originalist argument and stated that “the framers of the
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Constitution thought the compartmentalization of legislative power not just a tool of good
government or necessary to protect the authority of Congress from encroachment by the
Executive but essential to the preservation of the people’s liberty.”317 Judge Gorsuch’s
application of Originalism to the interpretation of the Constitution appears to align with Scalia’s,
and like Scalia he has shown a steadfast dedication to Original-Meaning Originalism. However,
since Originalist judges utilize its theory and methodology in the different manners, it will be
interesting to see how Judge Gorsuch will continue the legacy of Scalian-Originalism; or if he
will form his own brand of Originalism. The comparative research of Originalism that would
follow after Gorsuch takes his place on the Court will certainly be forthcoming, and will add to
the debate regarding Originalism’s legitimacy as a constitutional interpretive method and theory.
This thesis has examined the legitimacy of Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the
First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause from a Critical Legal perspective. Traditional
liberal legal scholars may find the Critical Legal Studies criteria of legal legitimacy, to further
equality and democratic participation based on the accepted indeterminate nature of the law, as
an erosion of First Amendment jurisprudence. However, formalist should not immediately
dismiss the arguments made by Critical Legal Studies simply because its theoretical framework
disputes the possibility of the Court to simplify and solidify First Amendment’s freedom of
speech doctrines and rationales. By accepting the Court’s duty to rule on First Amendment issues
on a case-by-case basis, according to the context surrounding each case, and to decide each case
from the position of a judicial activist seeking to find the result that would best pursue social
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equality, Critical Legal Studies is able to offer an alternative perspective to the formalist debate
regarding the legitimacy of Scalian-Originalism.
While this analysis found Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s
freedom of speech clause primarily illegitimate, with roughly less than a third of the cases being
legitimate from a Critical Legal perspective, it does not conclude that Scalian-Originalism as a
method and theory for First Amendment interpretation completely illegitimate or without merit.
This manuscript, also, did not examine Originalism as a theory and methodology beyond
Scalian-Originalism. The examination of other forms of Originalism, such as Justice Thomas’
Originalism, Ronald Dworkin’s “moral reading” Originalism, and Jack M. Balikin’s “living”
Originalism are left for future research. This analysis suggests both the legitimacy and
illegitimacy of Scalian-Originalism. It also argues that a consistency and predictability in
Scalian-Originalism’s interpretation of the First Amendment can be found based on Scalia’s
constant maintenance and strengthening of the elitist status quo. Hopefully, the research in this
manuscript will further the debate of Scalian-Originalism’s legitimacy by extending it beyond
the formal liberal legal perspective. By holding judges, and their theory and methodologies
accountable for the consequences of their rulings, it is possible for American society to create a
constitutional legal system that moves the society as a whole toward equality and universal
democratic participation.
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